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1.0 Introduction 
Forty-eight countries are currently on the United Nations’ list of Least Developed 
Countries (LDCs), which they in broad terms define “in terms of their low gross 
domestic product (GDP) per capita, weak human assets and high degree of economic 
vulnerability” (United Nations 2011). Whilst these countries bear many similarities, 
Bangladesh stands out in respect to its pharmaceutical sector. According to Business 
Monitor International, Bangladesh is the only LDC that is nearly self-sufficient in the 
production of pharmaceuticals, as “Local companies and those multinationals with 
manufacturing facilities cater for approximately 95 % of domestic demand” (Business 
Monitor International 2014, 45).  
In 1982 the Hussain Muhammad Ershad regime in Bangladesh assembled an expert 
committee to evaluate the problematic health conditions in the country and upon these 
findings, the committee was to formulate an industrial policy in pursuit of bettering 
public health. As a result came The National Drug Policy (NDP) of Bangladesh in 
1982, which recommended the establishment of a domestically driven industry that in 
turn would drive medicinal and pharmaceutical prices down. Up until 1982 the 
Bangladeshi pharmaceutical market had mostly been driven by imports and foreign 
Multi National Companies (MNC’s) operating within the country, why the 
encouragement of a domestically driven pharmaceutical industry met quite the 
opposition from these foreign firms. The implementation of the 1982 drug policy 
nearly did not see the light of day, as it was met with great resistance from various 
groups (Chowdhury 1995) and political instability was inherent in the Bangladeshi 
society at the time, having just gone through a regime change.  
Eventually the Drug Policy of 1982 came through and has been one of the main 
factors in explaining the emergence of the Bangladeshi pharmaceutical industry. 
Interestingly it was also in the 1980’s when the garments sector took off in 
Bangladesh. Native Bangladeshi scholar Mushtaq Khan has given an in-depth account 
of how the garments industry in Bangladesh emerged in a recent 2013 paper. Khan 
has written extensively on the subject of developmental issues in respect to 
corruption, democracy and governance, though he is most known for his works on 
examining the importance of the political settlement in economic development. In 
brief, “A political settlement emerges when the distribution of benefits supported by 
its institutions is consistent with the distribution of power in society, and the economic 
and political outcomes of these institutions are sustainable over time.” (Khan 2010, 
1). Khan uses a political settlements framework to explain varieties in institutional 
structures witnessed across different LDC’s, and how these institutional set-ups have 
spurred different economic developments.  
According to Khan, the characteristics of the political settlement in Bangladesh in the 
1980’s gave latitude for development to take place within the garments industry. He 
remarks that the government in this period had the necessary bureaucratic power to 
pursue political goals, though he also highlights that the capitalist and political elites 
saw an interest in developing the garments sector. We will in this paper investigate 
the pharmaceutical industry, which developed in the same period as the garments 
industry. The pharmaceutical industry came about because of the 1982 NDP, and thus 
we wish to evaluate whether Khan’s political settlements framework will generate 
answers to why the NDP emerged during this period.  
Bangladesh’s WTO membership entails that the country, by 2016, must comply with 
The Agreement on Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS), 
which in brief is an international agreement on the regulation, administration and 
protection of intellectual property rights. According to the TRIPS agreement, many of 
the Bangladeshi pharmaceutical products can until 2016 be exported to other LDCs, 
even though they are generic versions of on-patent products1. In turn though 
Bangladeshi pharmaceuticals cannot be exported to Europe, for example, until they 
comply with the standards of protection established by TRIPS, which puts several 
restraints on this industry in reaching its full potential and global competitiveness. By 
2016, Bangladesh will have to completely comply with the TRIPS agreement, and 
thus it must deal with the matter of global market rules and the subject of global 
competitiveness. Furthermore, the TRIPS agreement will put severe restraints on 
Bangladesh’s production of generic drugs, which make up the bulk of Bangladeshi 
produced pharmaceuticals. Under the TRIPS agreement, Bangladeshi pharmaceutical 
firms must abide by patent protection laws, which will drive the production cost up 
for Bangladeshi firms. Generic drugs are currently very cheap in Bangladesh and thus 
                                                      
1 A generic drug contains the same active ingredient as an originator drug, and it is thus a 
bioequivalent medicine. As the patents for innovative originator drugs expire, there is no 
intellectual property protection for these drugs (Business Monitor International 2014, 104). 
This will be further elaborated upon in the analysis. 
available for the broader population, these circumstances might change once TRIPS 
has to be abided by.  
In summary, the Bangladeshi pharmaceutical industry was established upon a certain 
industrial policy laid forth in the 1980’s. We wish to examine in this context whether 
Khan’s political settlement analysis of Bangladesh will assist us in providing answers 
to how the pharmaceutical industry emerged in the country, while a political 
settlements framework might also generate answers to how the pharmaceutical 
industry will deal with the impending TRIPS agreement.  
Since the pharmaceutical industry in Bangladesh meets the vast majority of the 
domestic demand today, the natural next step for the industry is to look elsewhere for 
exporting its products, but such a development might be a challenge for the 
Bangladeshi pharmaceutical industry. The TRIPS agreement is becoming an issue, 
which the industry must deal with in the near future, which also will show whether 
the Bangladeshi pharmaceutical companies are ready for global competitiveness. An 
interesting question to pose in this regard, is whether TRIPS will have a negative 
impact on the Bangladeshi pharmaceutical industry or whether it is the necessary 
force that will push this sector toward global competitiveness? 
 
2.0 Problem Formulation 
How did Bangladesh pursue the National Drug Policy (NDP) of 1982, and how did 
the development, which this policy spurred within the pharmaceutical industry, relate 
to the characteristics of the political settlement in the country? 
How can the current traits of the political settlement and the forthcoming compliance 
to the TRIPS agreement in 2016 be expected to affect the now-established 
pharmaceutical industry in Bangladesh?  
 3.0 Content of Chapters 
We begin our investigation by introducing some of the academic currents within the 
subject of economic development. First, we touch upon the institutional perspective 
on economic development, which posits that different institutional setups explain why 
countries experience different economic trajectories. We also relate this perspective to 
the work of Acemoglu & Robinson, who emphasize that understanding the interplay 
between political and economic institutions is key to understanding development. The 
first part of the theory serves as a background for delving more in depth into Mushtaq 
Khan’s political settlements theory. To briefly summarize: The political settlements 
approach seeks to determine the holding power of the domestic capitalist and political 
elite in developing countries. Defining the capabilities of the elites provides answers 
to their agency and how the constellation of power between these actors will shape 
politics. Khan argues in this regard that the political institutions of society often shape 
the economic institutions of society, and hence also economic development. In the 
latter section of this chapter we will engage in a discussion on economic 
development, comparing and contrasting the views of Khan with several other 
scholars.  
In our chapter on methodology, we will present our methodological considerations in 
relation to using political settlements as our theoretical approach, whilst we in relation 
to our empirical considerations will delve into the matter of conducting a single case 
study. Lastly we will seek to highlight some limitations that might preside within our 
research design and methodology. 
We will begin our analysis by providing a brief history of the international 
pharmaceutical industry, which serves as a background for elaborating on the 
National Drug Policy of 1982. We will hereafter highlight how this policy established 
the domestic pharmaceutical industry, as the country before had relied on imports and 
the presence of MNC’s. Then, we will conduct a political settlements analysis of 
Bangladesh, in which we witness that the country has been characterized by a 
competitive clientelistic political settlement over the course of four historical phases 
since the 1950’s. The final part of our analysis will deal with the current situation of 
the pharmaceutical industry in Bangladesh and explain what constitutes the 
impending compliance to the TRIPS agreement in 2016.  
Hereafter, we will go into a discussion about the future prospects of the interplay 
between the current political settlement, the Bangladeshi pharmaceutical industry, and 
TRIPS, and we will here also assess some of the possible courses of action for the 
Bangladeshi pharmaceutical industry in the future.   
4.0 Theory 
4.1 Institutions, the political elite and economic development 
Douglass North is often credited with having brought the institutional perspective into 
the debate on economic development (Khan 2010, 9), sparked by his recapitulative 
work on the subject called Institutions (D. North 1991). North’s introductory remarks 
from his seminal 1991 paper summarizes both what he defines as institutions, but also 
shows how institutions plays into a developmental perspective.  
“Institutions are the humanly devised constraints that structure political, economic 
and social interaction. They consist of both informal constraints (sanctions, taboos, 
customs, traditions, and codes of conduct), and formal rules (constitutions, laws, 
property rights). Throughout history, institutions have been devised by human beings 
to create order and reduce uncertainty in exchange.” (D. North 1991, 1) 
The subject of institutions has attracted much attention in regards to economic 
development and political sciences in general (as well as other branches of academia). 
The institutional perspective in economic development focuses on how different 
political and economic institutional setups structure the economy, hence allowing us 
to explain different economic development trajectories. Observing different countries 
and their institutional setup provides insight to why some nations prosper more than 
others in economic terms. North uses two terms on institutions in this regard, that of a 
limited access order society and open access order societies. In a limited access order 
society, balancing between violence and order gains its stability from interaction 
between the ruling elites, this characterizes the developing nations. High income and 
advanced countries are typically open access order societies, with their foundations 
based on multi-party systems and a secure governmental monopoly over violence (e. 
a. North 2007, 3-4). 
Institutions, is a term though that has branched off from the academic scene as well, 
and policymakers, international institutions, and governments have similarly 
embraced this perspective to development, where for example the Good Governance2 
agenda has gained a strong foothold (Grindle 2005).  
Two contemporary scholars on this subject of economic development and institutions 
are Daron Acemoglu and James Robinson. They distinguish similarly to North 
between the political and economic institutions, but emphasize that understanding the 
interplay between these two are key to understanding development. 
”While economic institutions are critical for determining whether a country is poor 
or prosperous, it is politics and political institutions that determine what economic 
institutions a country has.” (Acemoglu og Robinson 2013, 43) 
Much of Acemoglu and Robinson’s work is dedicated to inspecting these political 
institutions in society, where they seek to identify why some national institutional 
structures induce a prospering economy while others lead to impoverishment 
(Acemoglu og Robinson 2013, 83). An important distinction is made in this context 
between extractive and inclusive political institutions.  
Extractive political institutions place power in the hands of a narrow elite who wishes 
to consolidate its continuous power and wealth. Acemoglu and Robinson argue that 
development can take place within such an institutional configuration, though 
development is limited, due to (i) the elite will strive to hold on to their power and 
wealth, and development might in this instance disrupt their grip on capturing the 
most benefits (ii) suppression creates a lack of incentives for the broader society to 
innovate and thus develop (Acemoglu og Robinson 2013, 81,91,128). Inclusive 
political institutions on the other hand, place power in the hands of many, distribute 
wealth and create a ‘level playing field’. Under these conditions it is more likely to 
                                                      
2 Good Governance programs take many forms, but in their essence they seek to promote a 
”good” conduct of public affairs. Donors in third world countries as well as international 
institutions like The World Bank, blend themes of democracy, building institutional capacity, 
transparency and much more in their good governance programs, in seeking to further the 
development of less developed countries. 
witness the broader population prospers as wealth is divided more equally. 
Simultaneously a continuous trajectory of development is more likely in that the 
population has incentives to innovate, create new technologies and direct cycles of 
creative destruction3 toward a commonly beneficial path of development. The 
political institutional structure thus has influence upon the economic institutions of 
society, according to Acemoglu and Robinson. The research agenda of this paper 
stems from this observation on institutional interplay, namely that studying the 
political elite and the political institutions of society potentially can generate answers 
to questions related to economic development. Acemoglu and Robinson iterate this 
point in the following remark: 
“This synergistic relationship between extractive economic and political institutions 
introduces a strong feedback loop: political institutions enable the elites controlling 
political power to choose economic institutions with few constraints or opposing 
forces. They also enable the elites to structure future political institutions and their 
evolution. Extractive economic institutions, in turn, enrich the same elites, and their 
economic wealth and power help consolidate their political dominance.” (Acemoglu 
og Robinson 2013, 81) 
Acemoglu and Robinson point out with this statement that if we wish to understand 
development under extractive economic institutional structures, we must first seek to 
understand which political institutions that have created such economic institutional 
circumstances. Furthermore, if the ruling elites are at the helm and thus control these 
political institutions, then we must further investigate their role and how they shape 
these political institutions. 
4.2 Political Settlements theory  
The political settlements approach also emphasizes the role of the political elite in 
relation to understanding economic development. Political settlements analysis takes 
a similar (to that of Acemoglu and Robinson), although different approach to 
                                                      
3 A term coined by Joseph Schumpeter, which he defined as "process of industrial mutation 
that incessantly revolutionizes the economic structure from within, incessantly destroying the 
old one, incessantly creating a new one." (Schumpeter, 1942). Creative destruction stresses 
the importance of innovation, in that technologies and production methods will in time 
become highly competitive, where profit margins decrease, implicating that capitalists will 
have to innovative and gain technological advantages and thus again attain high profit 
margins.   
 
understanding the role of this elite controlling the political institutions of society. 
Political settlements theory stresses the point that if we want to understand 
governmental behavior, for example in choosing industrial policies, we must look at 
how ruling coalitions are constituted, and evaluate the capacity of this ruling elite to 
take action. This approach, credited to Mushtaq Khan (Khan 2010), seeks to examine 
the distribution of power in society in an attempt to evaluate economic development. 
More specifically, the approach underlines that the interplay between the ruling 
political elite and the domestic capitalist elite often shapes the economic processes in 
society. The political settlement is in this sense used as a term, which encompasses 
the set of institutions and power relations that compose the ‘social order’ in a 
particular developing country (Khan, 2010, s. 4).  
Khan’s approach has expanded upon the framework of The Survival of Ruling Elites 
Approach (SRE)4 and it is clear that political settlements takes much inspiration from 
the works of Joel Migdal, who similarly addresses the importance of understanding 
power distribution (between influential groups) in economic development. Migdal 
argued in his book Strong Societies and Weak States, from 1988 that the dispersion of 
power creates a scenario where the state role becomes an arena of accommodation, 
where the ruling elites seek a foothold by ‘trading’ between the political and capitalist 
sphere. The ruling elites are determined to stay in power according to the SRE 
approach. Establishing coalitions and maintaining them are therefore a necessity, and 
because the ruling coalition is dependent on the financing of their political security 
(i.e. elections require financing), they can exchange payoffs and policy preferences in 
return for political and financing support from the capitalists of the ruling elite 
(Migdal, 1988). An example of this would for instance be a tax-reduction policy on 
the mining sector that could be ‘traded’ for mobilization of the miners during 
election-periods. 
Khan similarly stresses the importance of understanding the interplay between the 
ruling coalition and the domestic capitalists in his political settlements approach. This 
evaluation is of necessity when underlining how different forms of governance 
structures are explanatory to the process of economic transformation. Khan argues 
that many developing countries are characterized by a patron-client-organizational 
                                                      
4 For scholars on this agenda see Moore and Schmitz (Moore & Schmitz, 2008) or Moon and 
Prasad (Moon & Prasad, 1994) 
structure5, where formal institutional structures might be in place, but typically an 
informal and personal institutional structure dominates the operations of the political 
settlement and its stability (Khan 2010, 53).  
“Many existing formal institutions in developing countries are often not enforced or 
are only partially enforced (…) formal institutions here do not behave in the expected 
ways nor are they impersonally implemented in any developing country. This 
observation is systematic and cuts across differences in culture, history and economic 
structure. The dominance of ‘personalized’ or informal exercises of power in these 
countries supports our broad description of these countries as ‘clientelist’. A society 
has a clientelist political settlement according to our definition when significant 
holding power is based on sources outside the incomes generated by formal 
institutions.” (Khan 2010, 53) 
Thus, if informal and personal relations between the ruling coalition and the capitalist 
elites are determinant of what constitutes a particular political settlement, then a 
Clientelist Political Settlement characterizes the institutions of that society, according 
to Khan. Khan explains that such informal and personal relations arise, because few 
resources of capital are at disposal in these societies, which in turn are claimed 
demand of by different powerful political groups (Khan, 2010, s. 5)6. Power is in this 
sense a quite tangible concept, in that the holding power between the different ruling 
elites becomes determinant of the political settlement (Khan, 2010, s. 6). Holding 
power is best explained with a ‘pie’ analogy, where different groups within society 
hold various percentages of this pie, and can either gain or lose their percentage when 
power is at distribution or contested. Actors of the political settlement tend to view 
power as a zero-sum game, when there is only a limited supply of resources, and 
contestation over said resources might loom around the corner (Philips 2013, 4). This 
is not to say that Khan would exclude a more dynamic view of power in his political 
settlement analysis. A more relational power analytical perspective will typically 
serve one well when looking at actors and their interactions. Furthermore, political 
                                                      
5 Patron-client-relation is a term used in this scenario, where exchanges are being made 
between the ruling coalition and the civil society. This can for instance imply the use of 
government funds for creating irregular means of partnership. 
6 The issue of resource scarcity mainly has to do with the fact that little tax-revenue is 
available for developing countries, why the resources available hold much value and can be 
misused as a bargaining chip in the patron-client business. 
settlements are always in (de) evolution and are continuously being renegotiated, this 
naturally stems from the aspect that power struggles often are at the core of this 
theoretical perspective (Philips 2013, 11).   
But Khan also sees power distribution as something that is dispensed horizontally and 
vertically within the ruling coalition, meaning that in order to secure stability, a ruling 
coalition must allocate its power in a ‘fair’ manner horizontally between the top elite, 
but also vertically, thus giving some power to subordinate actors. Khan uses this 
analogy of horizontal and vertical power, when he describes the inner working of a 
political settlement, this might for example be the vertical hierarchal structure of the 
government body, where there at each level of this hierarchy might be different 
horizontal actors (Khan 2010, 8)7.  
An important concept to highlight in the context of holding power and resources is 
that of rents, and the interrelated term barriers to entry. The concept of rents was 
originally introduced by David Ricardo8, and in his book Globalization, Poverty and 
Inequality (2005), Raphael Kaplinsky provides a useful summary of the theory of 
rents: 
“Rent arises from scarcity. This means having something – a resource, a capability, 
knowledge – which others do not possess. To be enduring, rents need to be protected 
by barriers to entry. Some of these rents and entry barriers are endogenous to the 
production chain – that is, they are constructed by producers themselves, acting 
either independently or in concert with other producers. Other rents and entry 
barriers are exogenous to the corporate sector. They are either a gift of nature or, 
increasingly more likely, generated by parties external to the production chain itself, 
but are available to selected producers, providing a capacity for generating and 
sustaining incomes” (Kaplinsky 2005, 62) 
Specifying the concept of rents a bit further, Kaplinsky explains the importance of 
having the abovementioned resources, capabilities or knowledge which constitute 
rents: “the levels of income arising to any producer or country operating in the global 
                                                      
7 We will return to this subject later in this section, when we review the bureaucracy of the 
political settlement.  
8 “Ricardo began with the observation that agricultural land was not homogeneous, and that 
those who had access to the scarce, fertile plots consequently derived a rent” (Kaplinsky 
2005, 62).  
economy will depend on the extent of rents which they command” (Kaplinsky 2005, 
64). Thus, it can be summed up that having rents can be translated into an income by 
taking advantage of resources, capabilities or knowledge, which others do not 
possess.  
Economic rents are a much debated subject in relation to clientelist societies, in that 
internal deals between the ruling elite and the capitalist might give an unfair and 
uncompetitive advantage to selected individuals9. Khan elaborates though that not all 
rents are ‘bad’ in clientelist societies, and that often these rents can spark the initial 
takeoff for a particular sector to develop. Khan explains:  
“Informal institutions are used to enable different types of rent capture by 
organizationally powerful groups and these informally generated economic resources 
reinforce and sustain their holding power over time. Some of these rents are very 
damaging in comparison with alternative feasible ways of organizing society. But 
other rents, including redistributive rents may be essential for maintaining stability 
and preventing a descent into violence. And finally, some rents even in these contexts 
may be playing a vital role in supporting the development of productive assets and 
technological capabilities. Therefore, a perspective which sees all rents and all 
informality as a problem is not very useful in this context.” (Khan 2010, 31) 
 
Turning back to what actually constitutes a political settlement, Khan divides the 
political settlement into three spheres; the political, bureaucratic and economic sub-
system, which together represent a full understanding of how the political settlement 
is organized.  
“The political subsystem describes the operational equilibrium between political 
organizations and the institutions (or rules) of political engagement.” (Khan 2013, 
15) 
“The administrative structure of a state is made up of bureaucratic organizations 
with specific financial and organizational capabilities” (Khan 2013, 17) 
                                                      
9 An example of this would for instance be a capitalist elite bribing officials to gain the 
exclusive rights on exploiting newly found minerals or oil.  
”Economic organizations refer to all collective productive organizations, ranging 
from informal peasant farms to formally organized large firms” (Khan 2013, 20) 
Khan notes that these sub-systems of the political settlement can take on various 
forms, which characterize the different forms of cohesive or fragmented arrangements 
of sub-systems that can be found in developing countries. A cohesive political 
settlement is able to pursue policies of economic transformation, while fragmented 
political settlements will struggle with this issue. Acemoglu and Robinson similarly 
stress the point that for any form of development to take place, there is a need for a 
centralized and cohesive convincing body of governance to act10, whether it might be 
under extractive or inclusive institutional setups (Acemoglu og Robinson 2013, 94). 
We will now briefly review the different types of sub-systems that Khan makes use 
of, a more in-depth understanding of the different sub-systems (related to this paper) 
will be provided in our analysis, where we with more efficiency (drawing examples 
from our specific case) better can explain what constitutes these specific sub-
systems11. 
The political sub-system can take on four general characterizations. (i) A Strong 
patrimonial political sub-system “faces little threat from excluded political 
organizations” (Khan 2013, 16) and is more powerful than that of lower-level actors. 
(ii) A vulnerable patrimonial political sub-system on the other hand is more 
contentious, in that excluded political organizations are stronger and can thus 
challenge the ruling coalition’s power and dominance (Khan 2013, 16). (iii) But 
political contention can also derive from endogenous actors to the political settlement, 
Khan defines this as a constrained patrimonial political sub-system, where ‘lower’ 
actors within the political sphere can challenge the ruling coalition’s grip on power 
(Khan 2013, 17). (iiii) Lastly, Khan refers to a competitive clientelist political 
structure, this incorporates both external and internal political actors challenging the 
                                                      
10 Various forms of acting bodies can exist to pursue economic development, authoritative 
regimes, democracies with the legitimacy deriving from the population, highly centralized 
clan structures or dominant one-party systems. Important to stress, is that some sort of 
cohesiveness is needed, if multiple actors are trying to dominate the political sphere, then it is 
unlikely that any action toward economic development can take place.  
11 We have chosen to highlight the whole spectrum of these different configurations of the 
sub-systems, though many of them will not be made use of in our analysis. Nonetheless, this 
might provide a background understanding for the reader, so he/she better can situate the 
Bangladeshi political settlement configurations in a broader spectrum.  
ruling coalition, such a setup is very vulnerable in that multiple actors are in demand 
of attention (Khan 2013, 17).  
Khan also divides the bureaucratic sub-system into four different categories to make a 
broad generalization of different fragmented and cohesive bureaucratic structures. 
The bureaucratic sub-system is more prone to internal struggles in Khan’s opinion, 
though it can be influenced by external actors trying to dictate or make an impact on 
the actions of the ruling coalition (Khan 2013, 18-19). The bureaucratic sub-system is 
at the helm of distributing the resources toward society and the political elite, and can 
in this sense be viewed as a political tool, for this reason Khan explains that much 
power is being bargained with this sub-system. Of essence is the ability of the ruling 
coalition to pursue its political goals, but also have control of dispersing and 
bargaining its power within the bureaucratic sub-system. These are Khan’s different 
characterizations of the bureaucratic sub-system. (i) A concerted bureaucratic 
authority is able to bargain power both vertically and horizontally, whilst also 
maintaining the purposes of its political goals and motivations (Khan 2013, 19). (ii) If 
the vertical and hierarchal structures are intact, but various groups are challenging the 
horizontal capabilities within the bureaucratic sub-system, then a divided 
bureaucratic authority is evident (Khan 2013, 19). (iii) On the other hand 
bureaucratic effectiveness might also be at stake if there is a cohesive horizontal 
structure, but the vertical structure is difficult to control. This could for example be 
characterized by a high control of the various ministry top positions, but lacking the 
subordinates of these ministries to carry out the orders coming from the top (Khan 
2010). Khan deems this a constrained bureaucratic authority (Khan 2013, 19). (iiii) 
The final form a bureaucracy can take, is that of a fragmented bureaucratic authority, 
where “coordination is difficult both horizontally and vertically” (Khan 2010, 19). 
Coordinating political goals and seeking to implement policies is very difficult under 
such a structure, in that there is opposition or a lack of ability to take action from a top 
horizontal position, but also the subordinates of the vertical structure, will or cannot 
follow orders.  
The economic sub-system is, contrary to the bureaucratic sub-system, defined by 
many external actors to the political sub-system. Khan remarks that, “economic 
organizations are at the heart of the economic transformations that constitute 
economic development” (Khan 2013, 20). Economic organizations can both be the 
domestic capitalist elite of society, but also peasant farmers, and both groups of this 
‘spectrum’ seek to influence politics in their favor. Similarly to the two foregoing 
sub-systems, Khan utilizes four different broad characterizations of the economic sub-
system. (i) If economic organizations can heavily influence the political settlement 
and have an impact on which policies that are being pursued, then they are 
characterized with high capability and are powerful (Khan 2013, 21). (ii) A high 
capability but weak economic sub-system on the other hand is defined by powerful 
economic organizations, which have limited bargaining power and influence upon the 
political and bureaucratic sphere (Khan 2013, 21). (iii) The third configuration of a 
moderate to low capability and powerful economic organizations, is defined by 
economic organizations who have weak incentives to achieving competitiveness, and 
instead use their “political power to capture rents and resources that eventually help 
them to finance their own capability development” (Khan 2013, 21-22). (iiii) In the 
final and fourth configuration economic organizations take no actions toward 
economic development, neither do these organizations seek to internally develop, nor 
do they seek to influence the political settlement in such a way to create incentives for 
their development. Khan notes that such a configuration “can result in the worst 
outcomes, with sustained underdevelopment”, this configuration is deemed moderate 
to low capability and weak (Khan 2013, 22). 
Khan argues that a shifting reproducible equilibrium12 is inherent between these sub-
systems of the political settlement (Khan, 2013, s. 14), where different ruling elites 
pursue the equilibrium most favorable to them (Khan, 2010, s. 6), hence the 
possibility of conflict is always a risk in a clientelist political settlement. Khan further 
notes that an operational equilibrium is the effective collaboration between the 
different sub-systems of the political settlement, implying that policies can be pursued 
and politics implemented when such an equilibrium is met. And if an operational 
equilibrium can establish itself between the different subsystems (and within them), 
as a consequence of a cohesive political settlement, a window of opportunity can arise 
where the ruling coalition and/or economic organizations might be able to pursue 
                                                      
12 Reproducible because the balance between these sectors continuously can shift and at 
equilibrium because the favorable balance between these sectors is dependent on the 
preferences of the ruling elites, and not on a universal understanding of what is the ‘best’ 
balance. 
 
economic transformation (Khan, 2013, s. 13). It is in this context that our foregoing 
review of the different sub-systems comes into play, where we have sought to 
underline that if fragmented structures are inherent in the political settlement, then it 
is unlikely that development can take place. It is difficult to generalize on this subject 
though, for example, in that a cohesive political sub-system might be integral to the 
political settlement, but on the other hand a weak and fragmented economic and 
bureaucratic sub-system are characterizing. Khan notes though that the operational 
equilibrium of the political settlement is not dependent on a complete cohesive 
structure across all the sub-systems, why we must conduct specific analyses of the 
different sub-systems according to our case. Windows of opportunity might arise, but 
economic transformation is the ‘second step’, which is dependent on two factors. (i) 
First, a growth-stability-trade-off must be inherent, meaning that the pursuit of 
economic growth must not challenge the stability of a political settlement. Khan 
iterates that, “If we consider a particular policy or institution that potentially supports 
growth, its introduction and incrementally better enforcement can on the one hand 
enhance developmental outcomes, but if the policy is against the interests of powerful 
organizations, its enforcement in this way also implies a cost in terms of stability for 
the ruling coalition.” (Khan 2013, 22). Thus, development and economic growth is 
not a given, even if there is an operational equilibrium inherent in the political 
settlement. Windows of opportunity are thus very dependent on the stability of the 
political settlement as well (Khan 2013, 22). (ii) Secondly, economic growth is also 
reliant on learning-by-doing, which relates very much to the economic sub-system of 
the political settlement. The success of a policy’s implementation, lies in its final 
achievements, and if firms or economic organizations have not properly developed 
during the policy’s implementation, then industrial policies do not promote economic 
growth. The proper development rests on whether economic organizations actually 
are learning and refining new production methods, adopt new technologies properly 
and gain the tacit knowledge13 of production. If these economic actors simply are 
gathering ‘bad’ rents from these policies, then sectors do not develop (Khan 2013, 
23). Thus a window of opportunity does not necessarily guarantee economic growth, 
                                                      
13 Tacit knowledge is for example the knowledge needed to use a machine efficiently, and 
workers gain it in their jobs through learning by doing, while it is not something that is 
written down (Schwartz, 2010: 91, 246, 286) 
it is rather the aftermath and the success of policy implementations that dictate the 
economic development.  
On a further note, it is important to underscore that an operational equilibrium is 
dependent on several supplementary aspects. For one, implementing industrial 
policies, for example (in said window of opportunity), heavily relies on the skills of 
state bureaucrats and whether these have the technical and practical knowledge about 
the industry one is trying to develop (Whitfield et al. 2013, 6)14. Secondly, 
“capitalists pursue profits above all else, so rents have to have conditions for 
increasing productivity and upgrading.” (Whitfield et al., DRAFT: The politics of 
industrial policy and political settlements 2014, 8), thus bureaucrats face the difficult 
task of providing the necessary economic conditions for capitalists to learn-for-
productivity (rather than to simply capture rents, and not develop the sector), whilst 
also pursuing the political goal. These aspects relate to a high degree to the 
bureaucratic sub-system.  
In summary, the political settlement theory takes an approach trying to determine how 
different institutional structures of the patron-client networks, characterizing many 
developing countries, have certain repercussions for the degree of fragmentation 
among the ruling coalitions (based upon different equilibria). Hence making it a 
theoretical approach that also tries to define how the allocation of power in a society 
shapes certain politics and policies. Important to highlight is that political settlements 
are ongoing processes, the analytical focus rests “on the on-going politics and the 
underlying and evolving longer-term elite power relations and negotiations that 
influence the shape of institutions and how players work within and around them.” 
(Laws, Political Settlements, Elite Pacts, and Governments of National Unity 2012, 
1). Political settlements are in continuous change, why one must consider the time-
span of one’s analytical scope, for example is it sufficient to evaluate the current state 
of a political settlement or should one rather seek to evaluate it in the context of 
previous political settlement characteristics? We will later in this chapter address this 
issue of historical perspectives to examining a political settlement. 
                                                      
14 We will return to this subject in our analysis, highlighting that an external committee was 
brought in to help devise an industrial policy on the pharmaceutical sector in Bangladesh.  
4.3 Political Settlements and New Institutional Economics perspective to 
economic development 
It should be noted that institutions play an important link in portraying how the views 
of Khan assimilates the approaches of North, and Acemoglu & Robinson, but on the 
other hand Khan’s political settlements approach differs distinctively on the subject of 
institutions as well. We will in this section take on a broader discussion of political 
settlements, comparing and contrasting its viewpoints in respect to North, and 
Acemoglu and Robinson. Furthermore, we seek to illuminate with this section exactly 
how the political settlements perspective falls into a developmental economic debate, 
touching upon themes of capitalism and institutional transformation.  
North’s framework is based on the notion that the differences in economic prosperity 
witnessed across developing states, are due to different economic institutions and 
their respective degrees of effectiveness. The economic focus in North’s works has 
deemed his framework the New Institutional Economic perspective (NIE). Institutions 
play the pivotal role in explaining the causality between governance and economic 
transformation according to North, why the NIE approach in large part focuses on 
‘getting the institutions right’15.  
While North’s framework derives from an economic background, Khan’s political 
settlements approach takes its offset from a political dimension, namely that 
analyzing the political settlement will yield answers about the economics of society. 
In this regard Khan’s framework resembles the point, raised by Acemoglu and 
Robinson, that the political institutions of society shape the economic institutions and 
hence also economic development. The political settlements framework goes deeper 
in its analysis of actors and their holding power within institutions (Khan, 2010, s. 
22), in comparison to the research agendas of North, Acemoglu & Robinson who 
‘stay’ at a broader analytical level of institutions in their research method.  
But Khan differs from the NIE approach in many other aspects as well; in particular 
he distances himself from a Weberian16 understanding of capitalism, making the 
                                                      
15 It is this logic, which the good governance agenda has derived from.  
16 Sociologist and economist Max Weber, wrote on the subject of rationality embedded in the 
capitalistic structure of society. This applied itself to several dimensions of the societal 
structure i.e. the bureaucracy, the judicial system and the political sphere. We do not wish to 
directly interpret on the works of Weber, but highlight that his ideals on bureaucracy and 
argument that capitalist transformation is historically based on arbitrary means of 
governance, personal pursuits of gaining power and informal interventions in 
bureaucratic procedures (Khan, 2010, s. 61). ‘The Weberian ideal’17 (and in part the 
NIE approach) argues contrarily that the impersonal bureaucracy is a pre-condition 
necessary for capitalism to take off. North’s causal focus between governance and 
economic transformation thus builds on a Weberian assumption of creating an 
effective institutional (bureaucratic) framework, which in turn will initiate a 
transformation toward capitalism (North, 2007). Credible institutions and their 
commitment to economic transformation thus become of essence within the NIE and 
Weberian approach. Interrelated, the NIE approach particularly argues that a credible 
commitment to economic transformation is most optimally reached with limited 
governmental interference (North, 2007). Khan notes that such standards are not 
necessary for the economic developmental process, in that historical evidence 
contradicts this assumption of credible and impersonal bureaucratic commitments 
toward economic development. Khan points out in this regard that an equilibrium 
(which can generate a window of opportunity) between the economic, bureaucratic 
and political sub-systems of a political settlement is heavily dependent on government 
interference that can in actuality spur development (Khan, 2010, s. 9-24).  
Khan simply has a different understanding on how societies move from a limited 
access order structure to an open access order one. North advocates that the move 
from limited to open access order is completed by ‘getting the institutions right’ and 
limiting government intervention in the process of economic transformation. Khan on 
the other hand creates a different narrative, namely that such a transition is heavily 
influenced by the state18 and that looking solely at institutions is insufficient in one’s 
analysis of economic transformation. A Weberian bureaucratic state (operating 
formally) is thus not a pre-requisite but a product of capitalist transformation in 
Khan’s opinion.  
                                                                                                                                                            
capitalism have founded a certain ideal-type of understanding development. The Weberian 
ideal is in this context used as a short-term to explaining that the impersonal and rational 
practices of the bureaucracy are in this sense determinant of capitalism itself. This mainly 
comes to show in the good governance agenda, which we will discuss later in this section.  
17 See footnote above. 
18 Though his analytical scope is based on the political settlement as a whole; the ruling 
coalition and the domestic capitalist elite. 
Khan illustrates in the following quote his view upon economic transformation and 
the historical evidence backing his observations.  
“Despite its apparent fit with some observations of the governance problem in 
developing countries, Weber's analysis is misleading because it conflates the 
functional requirements of advanced capitalism with an analysis of the constraints 
and requirements of the period of transition during which capitalism is being created 
and institutionalized in developing countries. No advanced country organized this 
process of transition by first successfully institutionalizing a bureaucracy that would 
pass the test of impersonality and modernity at a time when its productive sectors 
were still based primarily on, say, peasant or handicraft production.” (Khan 2010, 
63) 
Simply extending market opportunities does not spur a move toward capitalism, as 
neo-classical economics would advocate, transformations toward capitalism do not 
occur unexpectedly, but rather they are the product of political struggles over property 
rights. It can be quite diffuse to understand what is at the root of this discussion when 
several elements are at play: institutions, economic development and historical 
evidence. Khan’s critique of the good governance agenda (which we touched briefly 
upon earlier), might in this regard be a clear way to exhibit what the controversy is 
founded upon.  
Good governance programs build on the notion that highly developed and advanced 
countries (like those in the ‘West’) have prospering markets, because they have 
advanced institutions, which enforce the rule of law, transparency & accountability, 
and which are fundamentally democratic (Kjær 2004). The logic is thus, if we build 
institutional capabilities in developing countries based on these same ‘democratic’ 
values, then economic development will take place because such values and 
institutions further compel economic development. Khan argues though, that there is 
no historical evidence to verify such a development trajectory, typically these desired 
values of democracy and ‘western’ ideals of institutions are the product of prosperity, 
not the means to achieving prosperity (Khan, SOAS Media - Youtube 2008). An 
interesting observation in this regard, is that while there might be high developing 
nations, who are rapidly developing economically (i.e. China and India), they do not 
yet share the same institutions as the west. This implies that just because you have the 
economic resources to build western ideal institutions, such a development is not 
necessarily given beforehand. Developments toward the ‘right’ set of institutions can 
take many decades, which was the case with western institutions (Acemoglu og 
Robinson 2013) (Khan, SOAS Media - Youtube 2008). If we apply these lessons to 
the least developed nations, then it becomes apparent that these nations must first 
make the move from the least developed class into the highly developing nations 
segment, and only then can they move toward western ideals of institutions, which is 
the last ‘station’ they should arrive at.  
The important question in regard to this paper is thus, how does development from the 
least developed class (which Bangladesh belongs to) into the highly developing 
segment take place? The key words in this context are political stability, growth 
sectors and vulnerable sectors. There is no doubt that for any development to take 
place, developing countries need political stability, which induces a climate for 
economic development. Such stability stems from addressing the needs of both the 
elites of society, but also the general population. Thus, while a ruling coalition might 
be very interested in promoting the growth of already flourishing sectors19, vulnerable 
sectors of society must also be addressed for a political settlement to maintain 
stability (Khan, SOAS Media - Youtube 2008). In both instances of either promoting 
growth sectors or vulnerable sectors, Khan argues that the political elite must play an 
active role in choosing industrial policies to address these issues. Ruling coalitions in 
developing countries thus have to respond to pressures from different divisions of 
society in order to maintain stability and hence also their grip on power. The domestic 
capitalist elite might demand attention to certain growth sectors, which they are 
capturing rents from, but the broader population might also be requesting devotion to 
sectors, which they see as important20. 
                                                      
19 There could be several reasons for a political settlement to be interested in promoting the 
growth of already flourishing sectors, an obvious example is that the ruling coalition is 
politically interested in promoting economic growth for the development of the society in 
general. Another more cynical example is, that often the political settlement is capturing rents 
from these already established sectors, why growth here within will drive their holding 
power. 
20 This will play an important role in explaining why the political settlement in Bangladesh 
sought to promote a pharmaceutical sector in the country, which could address health issues 
that were inherent in the country at the time.  
Let us apply this view of development to expand on our previous considerations on 
capitalism and the Weberian ideal. Whitfield et al. utilize a political settlements 
approach in their paper The Politics of Industrial Policy and Political Settlement, to 
propose an understanding of when and under which conditions industrial policies can 
successfully be implemented. In relation to capitalism and economic transformation 
they note that:  
“Capitalism […] depends on changing property rights structures and creating 
compulsions for primitive accumulation21 to be channeled into the creation of new 
productive enterprises. The dynamism of capitalism, as a mode of production, did not 
derive mainly from efficient markets for exchange, but rather from the emergence of a 
structure of rights that compelled both capitalists and workers to pursue productivity 
growth.” (Whitfield et al. 2014, 10-11) 
The process of primitive accumulation is a contested subject in this regard. Did the 
evolution and transformation into capitalism come about in a peaceful and gradual 
manner? (Hall 2013) Neo-classical economists would argue that incentives, built by 
the institutions of society, drive this process, the political settlements framework takes 
on a different narrative though, namely that fundamental transformations in the 
structure of property rights are what drive primitive accumulation. If we are to draw 
on the example of the ‘West’ and how these nations have transitioned into capitalism, 
Acemoglu and Robinson argue also that the restructuring of property rights played an 
important role. They note that the move from extractive to inclusive institutions came 
about because power was distributed more equally and the vulnerable sectors of 
society were addressed (Acemoglu og Robinson 2013). This is an interesting 
historical observation, in that a strategy of building the foundations for the weakest of 
society, in turn will create more economic prosperity. 
4.4 Transformation and critical junctures in political settlements theory 
Continuing on the subject of change and transformation, we also wish to highlight 
some theoretical points on how transformation might occur, namely whether change 
occurs in a ‘ruptured’ manner or incrementally. For Acemoglu and Robinson, 
understanding development relates to a high degree in understanding when 
                                                      
21 Primitive accumulation refers to the transformation from pre-capitalist modes of production 
into capitalism.  
transformations are made in institutional structures. They argue that we typically 
witness development take place when transformations are made from extractive 
institutions to inclusive ones22. 
“Understanding how history and critical junctures shape the path of economic and 
political institutions enables us to have a more complete theory of the origins of 
differences in poverty and prosperity. In addition, it enables us to account for the lay 
of the land today and why some nations make the transition to inclusive economic and 
political institutions while others do not.” (Acemoglu og Robinson 2013, 101) 
This viewpoint is somewhat similar to that of Khan, namely that transitions between 
institutional structures can occur in society with abrupt or ruptured traits. Acemoglu 
and Robinson examine these critical junctures at a broad level and do not give much 
attention to how incremental changes can lead toward inclusive institutions23. 
Acemoglu and Robinson’s adoption of the critical juncture framework is based upon 
the notion of path dependency, which implies that antecedent events feed into either a 
negative or positive feedback loop, which in turn make institutional changes difficult 
to reverse. Feedback loops are seen in this sense as continuous elements that over 
time become embedded in a certain institutional structure, contingent events are in 
this way the only forces that can break such an embedded structure and change a 
system.    
Khan’s focus on the other hand is based upon both gradual incremental change and 
abrupt changes, furthermore his framework takes a more specific analytical scope, 
evaluating how these transitions occur within the political settlement, he elaborates 
that:  
“If a political settlement ceases to be viable, discontinuous change can come about in 
the evolution of institutions or the organization of power. This is to be distinguished 
from gradual processes of growth, institutional change and political mobilizations 
that incrementally alter political settlements in all societies. No political settlement is 
static and all settlements are continuously evolving. But the evolution can sometimes 
                                                      
22 Similarly to Khan, Acemoglu and Robinson acknowledge that formal governance has 
historically not been a pre-requisite to capitalism.  
23 For example in explaining Europe’s transition from serfdom to more inclusive institutions, 
Acemoglu and Robinson point toward The Black Plague as a reason to explaining why a 
sudden institutional transformation happened. 
be gradual; at other times stability or economic performance can collapse as a result 
of incompatible evolutions of power relationships or institutions and lead to a crisis.” 
(Khan 2010, 4) 
Khan thus interprets that transformation and evolution of the political settlement can 
be witnessed from both an incremental and abrupt perspective. What he seeks to 
stress though is, that an operational equilibrium24 must stay inherent or evolve when 
these changes occur in the political settlement. So whilst we often might see that 
economic development comes about when transformations occur, change in itself is 
insufficient as to explaining economic development, it rather depends on the 
institutions of society and whether they are able to carry out economic development. 
Nonetheless, transformations might induce a more benign environment for these 
operational equilibria to emerge (Khan 2013, 14). 
We will in our section of discussion return to this subject of transformations, where 
we will highlight that the characteristics of the political sub-system in Bangladesh has 
remained competitive clientelistic. In this context we will also delve into the matter of 
how the NDP emerged in 1982. The policy was implemented shortly after a regime 
change, indicating that there had been a transformation of the political settlement. 
Hence it will be interesting to assess whether these notions of incremental change and 
critical junctures will assist us in understanding why the policy came about.  
5.0 Methodological considerations 
In the following section we will present some methodological considerations in 
relation to using political settlements as our theoretical approach and the Bangladeshi 
pharmaceutical industry as our empirically founded single-sector case study.  
                                                      
24 This does not necessarily imply that an operational equilibirum between all the sub-systems 
must maintain itself, rather it is to be understood that for example capabilities from the 
bureaucratic system must carry over from one regime to the next. 
5.1 Political Settlements Theory 
As political settlements theory is a relatively new research method to addressing 
questions of economic development25, the most noticeable implication of using this 
approach, is that a coherent, clear and universally applicable methodological 
framework has not yet been established. Guidelines are yet to be formulated on how 
to apply this theoretical approach to different empirical cases. A case in point is, that 
whilst Khan has identified different sub-systems of society, which constitute the 
political settlement, a step-by-step list on how to pursue this research agenda has not 
yet been clearly developed. How one is to evaluate the political, bureaucratic and 
economic sub-systems of the political settlement is not yet specified in the political 
settlement approach. Thus, if scholars are not following the same methodological 
procedures, is there a chance that their research papers are yielding incoherent 
answers? It is an issue that is difficult to evaluate, in that a political settlement 
approach is so broad encompassing as it is, which further complicates creating a step-
by-step methodological guide. 
On a further note, Edwards Laws notes that there, as of yet, is not a consensus on how 
to define and understand the key concepts of the theory (Laws 2012, 1). Defining the 
political settlement thus becomes a necessary objective for each research paper on the 
subject, opening much space for “subjective” interpretations by scholars foreign to 
this theoretical approach.  
This is a major concern for those who want to create primary empirical evidence in 
this field, as it might be complicated to decide on which definitions one should adhere 
to. Furthermore, because a political settlements analysis requires an extensive insight 
into the different sub-systems of a society, it can be quite a task to keep one’s analysis 
short and concise. With such a large ground to cover in one’s analysis, Khan 
acknowledges that secondary literature can constitute sufficient sources, if there is 
enough information on the subject26. In our case, this seems to be evident, in that 
Khan has conducted extensive research on Bangladesh’s political settlement, and thus 
we have a great body of secondary literature to make use of (Khan 2013). To broaden 
                                                      
25 Political settlements theory thus addresses a research area that has been present in academia 
for quite some time, though its combinational use of both political institutions and power 
distribution is a relatively new area of research. 
26 Khan’s own work and political settlements analysis of Thailand comes to mind in this 
regard, where he mostly relied on secondary sources (Khan, 2010: 77).  
our theoretical foundation, we have chosen to include some supplementary views 
related to the research area of institutions, economic development and the political 
settlement. As was evident in our chapter of theory, we have chosen to include 
scholars that abide to a institutional analytical framework (North, Acemoglu & 
Robinson). We have furthermore sought to create a narrative in our chapter of theory, 
explaining where Khan’s political settlement approach derives from (North and 
Migdal). The key objective with including these ‘supplementary’ authors is to 
compare and contrast the views of Khan, in an attempt to highlight how his views on 
economic development are not the singular formula to answering questions related to 
economic development.  
This paper will apply the political settlements approach to the single sector case of the 
pharmaceutical industry in Bangladesh. Khan’s framework will help us highlight how 
the political institutions and how a political settlements framework helps us 
understand the economic development that has taken place within the industry.  
In Khan’s own single sector investigation of the Bangladeshi textiles industry, he 
includes an analysis of what we would call more global political economical factors 
that played an important role in this sector’s development27, thus not solely relying on 
his political settlements framework (Khan 2013, 101-117). Likewise, in this paper we 
will be speaking abroad the political settlements framework and include global 
economic (external) trends that are influencing the pharmaceutical industry in 
Bangladesh, in particular the compliance to the TRIPS agreement in 2016. In short, to 
make our research objective clear for the reader, we will be conducting an 
investigation of the single sector development of the Bangladeshi pharmaceutical 
industry and how it related to a particular political settlement. We will then draw upon 
the impending TRIPS agreement and investigate how this agreement will affect the 
further development of the pharmaceutical industry. 
                                                      
27 In this analysis of the garments industry, Khan highlighted that factors such as the Multi 
Fiber Arrangement (MFA) and the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) played a 
pivotal role to understanding how this sector emerged in Bangladesh. Furthermore, he also 
underscores how the international environment at the industry’s inception helped further the 
agenda of building this sector up, for example there was much support from donors because 
Bangladesh recently had become independent and had experienced a great famine (Khan, 
2013).  
5.2 Single case research design 
As the case with using the political settlements theory, our choice of doing a single 
case research design also has certain methodological implications, which we must 
take into consideration. According to Alexander L. George and Andrew Bennett, 
“single case research designs can fall prey to selection bias or over-generalization of 
results” (George og Bennett 2005, 80), but the authors do argue that single well-
selected cases can serve studies well (George og Bennett 2005, 80). In this context, it 
should be noted that the point of departure for our investigation is the actual case 
itself, Bangladesh’s pharmaceutical industry. Methodological considerations in 
relation to single case research designs are typically focused on what knowledge case 
evaluations can generate on theoretical perspectives. The task is thus to prove that 
one’s case selection is the most optimal to (in) validate specific elements about a 
theoretical approach. This on the other hand is not the task of this paper, the purpose 
of our case study is rather to elaborate on our sector case, not to verify the works of 
Khan or the other authors that we have included. Nonetheless, we have chosen to 
elaborate on the process-tracing method, which suits a research design where the 
offset is the case itself and the purpose is not singularly to validate a theory.  
George and Bennett characterize process-tracing “as a procedure for identifying steps 
in a causal process leading to the outcome of a given dependent variable of a 
particular case in a particular historical context” (George og Bennett 2005, 176). 
When using a process-tracing method, one takes all the observable implications of a 
theoretical framework and applies it to one’s dependent variable. This differs from 
methodological approaches where the dependent and independent variables are 
compared and contrasted, this would typically be done in a comparative case study 
when two or several cases are made use of (George og Bennett 2005, 206). In our 
case, using a political settlements theoretical approach, defining the independent 
variable becomes a challenging task. If we view the pharmaceutical sector as our 
dependent variable, how do we compare and contrast this in relation to the evolving 
political settlement? Our independent variable of the political settlement is defined by 
a multiple of aspects; the three sub-systems, relations between political and capitalist 
elites, power distribution/holding power, etc. For this reason a process-tracing 
technique, which emphasizes examining the theory as a whole, is better suited for the 
research design of this paper28. Our observation points will be the NDP of 1982 and 
the impending TRIPS agreement, which we will examine the pharmaceutical industry 
from. Our political settlements analysis will in this sense be our reference between 
these two events, but it is impossible to boil this analysis down to a meaningful single 
independent variable.  
Even though theory testing is not the core objective of this paper, George and Bennett 
note that: “Process-tracing is an indispensable tool for theory testing and theory 
development not only because it generates numerous observations within a case, but 
because these observations must be linked in particular ways to constitute an 
explanation of the case. It is the very lack of independence among these observations 
that makes them a powerful tool for inference. The fact that the intervening variables, 
if truly part of a causal process, should be connected in particular ways is what 
allows process-tracing to reduce the problem of indeterminacy.” (George og Bennett 
2005, 207) 
Thus, when our focus shifts from defining an independent variable, the issue of 
intervening variables or inference is diminished. In the detailed narrative version of a 
process-tracing methodological approach, emphasis is laid upon presenting a story 
narrative, chronicling how events came about (George og Bennett 2005, 210). This is 
very much the research method in this paper, where we have sought to chronicle the 
political settlement evolution of Bangladesh through the last 50 years, and how the 
characteristics of these political settlements have influenced outcomes within the 
pharmaceutical industry in Bangladesh29. Our thorough historical review of the 
Bangladeshi political settlement, where we have not defined a single independent 
variable, will in this sense help us eliminate the risk of intervening variables. 
Furthermore, when using a political settlements analysis it is apparent that fulfilling 
answers cannot be generated about the current traits of the political settlement, if one 
ignores the historical evolution of it. 
                                                      
28 We thus do not seek to define a singular independent variable, but take into the 
consideration the political settlements theoretical approach (in relation to Bangladesh) as a 
whole.  
29 George and Bennett note that one must not fall trap of relying on the notion ”that history 
repeats itself”(George & Bennett, 2005: 210), wherefore our assessment of TRIPS rather will 
rely on the current events and characteristics of the political settlement and not directly relate 
our historical findings to speculate on the future of the pharmaceutical industry in 
Bangladesh.  
  
5.3 Methodological limitations 
The observant reader will notice that this paper relies heavily on the views of Khan in 
our theoretical framework, whilst a large part of our political settlements analysis also 
builds on Khan’s works. As a consequence we must address the issue of whether our 
research is ‘blinded’ in its design, in that we so closely are adhering to Khan’s works. 
What we wish to highlight in this respect, is that we rather are using Khan’s 
framework and work on Bangladesh to deliberate upon the pharmaceutical industry in 
Bangladesh, not simply repeat what Khan already has examined. Khan’s 2013 piece 
on Bangladesh is currently the most in-depth analysis of the Bangladeshi political 
settlement, why we have heavily relied on this piece in our analysis. We have plucked 
the aspects from this report that we have found most relevant to this paper’s research 
agenda and not attempted to give a step-by-step account of what constitutes this 
report. For obvious reasons we have not been able to conduct primary research on the 
political settlement in Bangladesh, why we have chosen to rely on secondary 
literature, in this context Khan’s 2013 report is the most cohesive and in-depth 
account available. As mentioned earlier in the methodology, we have included several 
‘supplementary’ authors to highlight that there are opinions on economic 
development, which differ from Khan’s. In this context, it could also have been 
interesting to introduce Adrian Leftwich (and Sarah Philips), whose view on 
economic development is quite similar to Khan’s. Leftwich criticizes the one-sided 
focus on institutions in much work on economic development, as he argues that 
institutions do not function on their own, or in isolation from each other. He finds it 
necessary to ‘go beyond’ institutions in one’s analysis, also analyzing the role of 
human agency, leaders, elites and coalitions in the developmental process. (Leftwich 
og Sen 2011, 319, 324) (Leftwich 2010, 93). Due to the paginal space restrictions this 
paper had to abide by, we have not chosen to delve deeper into Leftwich’s work, but 
his focus on human agency is definitely a topic, which could be incorporated into 
further research about both the political settlement of Bangladesh and the 
development within the country’s pharmaceutical industry.  
Another issue we wish to address in relation to our methodological limitations, is how 
our research framework comes short in deliberating upon external ideological and 
political influences to the Bangladeshi society30. We will at several points in our 
analysis highlight that specific ideological mindsets (socialism and liberalism) have 
influenced the political agenda in Bangladesh, though we have little basis in our 
theoretical framework to elaborate upon this subject. We will for example at one point 
highlight how the American presence in Southeast Asia in the 1970’s might have 
influenced the Bangladeshi political elite to adhere to a liberal mindset. Our political 
settlement theoretical framework comes short of verifying this point though, why it is 
an element that is left in the spectrum of speculation. We have chosen to include these 
elements to inform the reader of possible connections, rather than simply leaving 
these features out of the equation.  
6.0 Analysis 
6.1 A Brief Historical Review of the International Pharmaceutical 
Industry  
The following section provides a brief sketch of the historical developments in the 
international pharmaceutical industry, which we have included for the purpose of 
being able to situate the developments in Bangladesh’s pharmaceutical industry 
within an international context. 
According to Alfred D. Chandler, the creation of the pharmaceutical industry began 
suddenly in the 1880’s, as the unification of imperial Germany and the growth of its 
economy gave the country’s “chemical and pharmaceutical manufacturers scale of 
operations from which they could dominate European markets”31 (Chandler 2005, 4), 
and simultaneously, the maturing of key technologies in transportation and 
communications in the US “made possible mass production and distribution for 
national and worldwide markets” (Chandler 2005, 4). However, a difference between 
the first European and American companies was, that the American ones mass 
produced drugs based on natural sources, while the European first movers “started by 
commercializing new learning in chemistry to produce manmade drugs” (Chandler 
                                                      
30 This is a sub-genre and research area in itself within political science. We do not have a 
methodological framework nor the paginal space to delve into this research area in this report.  
31 According to Herman Schwartz, Germany experienced its second big wave of development 
in this period as its industry took part in the leading-sector cluster of electricity and chemistry 
Invalid source specified..  
  
2005, 291). Thus, until World War I, the US companies relied on German and Swiss 
firms to supply new drugs (Chandler 2005, 32), but the wartime embargo on German 
products “encouraged American drug companies to develop their technical and 
functional capabilities and to concentrate on improving existing products while 
developing new ones” (Chandler 2005, 179). During the interwar years, American 
companies then became the Europeans’ major challengers (Chandler 2005, 5), and in 
this period, the pharmaceutical industry focused on enhancing marketing and 
advertising capabilities for the sale of over-the-counter (OTC)32 drugs. However, in 
the 1940’s, a therapeutic revolution occurred in the US, which was accelerated by the 
World War II crash programs in the production of new antibiotics. By the end of the 
1950’s, the pharmaceutical industry had changed beyond recognition, the major 
impact being the rapid growth of prescription drugs (Chandler 2005, 179). This 
transformation was possible because the American crash programs (for example in 
penicillin and sulfa drugs) provided financing that expanded research and facilities 
(Chandler 2005, 33), and again in the 1970’s and 1980’s “the pharmaceutical industry 
enjoyed new opportunities as advances in scientific learning introduced new 
technologies to be commercialized for worldwide markets”33 (Chandler 2005, 35). In 
the 1990’s, the pharmaceutical industry was characterized by a wave of international 
mergers (Chandler 2005, 36), but basically, the concentration in the pharmaceutical 
industry remained similar to what it had been initially: “European enterprises at the 
end of the twentieth century – primarily those based in Germany and Switzerland – 
remained leaders in sales and revenues, while yielding substantially to American 
competitors in the capacity for innovation” (Chandler 2005, 5).  
Elaborating on how the initial development in a group of scientific sectors (the 
pharmaceutical sector being one of them) took place, Chandler argues that “Private 
and public universities and research institutions played critical roles in creating the 
broader technical knowledge”, while private, profit-seeking enterprises 
commercialized the products based on the new science, and brought them into public 
use (Chandler 2005, 283). Furthermore, Chandler argues that these enterprises 
                                                      
32 OTC drugs are sold directly to consumers, and do not require a prescription to be sold to 
patients 
33 ”the pharmaceutical industry entered a new era based on new learning in biochemistry, 
microbiology, enzymology, and the new scientific discipline of molecular genetics” (Chandler 
2005, 292)  
benefited both from maintaining their close ties to sources of learning, and from 
government crash programs in times of international crises and certain public policies 
in quieter times (Chandler 2005, 283-284). Another interesting point is that these 
enterprises were geographically concentrated in the US, northwestern Europe, and 
Japan, which “clearly provided the most fertile environment for commercializing the 
new products because they were close to sources of raw material and energy, as well 
as to rich sources of learning in universities and research institutes” (Chandler 2005, 
284). Consequently, the first movers and their close followers in the pharmaceutical 
industry “created barriers to entry by building their integrated learning bases – the 
set of coordinated technical, functional, and managerial capabilities – that enabled 
them to develop, produce, distribute, and sell first in national and soon after in world 
markets” (Chandler 2005, 284). As these early companies developed, the 
infrastructure of the pharmaceutical industry was essentially complete by the end of 
the 1920’s, and since then, there have been powerful barriers to entry in this industry 
(Chandler 2005, 285). Applying Kaplinsky’s summary on the theory of barriers to 
entry to the pharmaceutical industry, it seems logical to conclude that they were 
constructed by the producers themselves, and consequently, we can consider them 
endogenous to the production chain of the industry. We also saw that the barriers to 
entry have been powerful since the end of the 1920’s, and that the firms in the first 
mover countries Germany and Switzerland, and their close follower USA, have 
remained ahead in this industry. Therefore, it would also seem that the barriers to 
entry have protected the rents in the pharmaceutical industry sufficiently for them to 
be enduring.        
In this way, the development of a pharmaceutical industry in a developing country is 
set to be very different from the early development in the sector, given that 
newcomers will have to deal with barriers to entry, which did not exist initially. In the 
next section we will highlight how Bangladesh’s pharmaceutical industry emerged, 
and this was under very different conditions than in the countries, which we have 
touched upon here. 
6.2 The National Drug Policy of 1982 
This chapter will deal with the developments in Bangladesh’s pharmaceutical industry 
related to the National Drug Policy (NDP) of 1982. First, the background, against 
which the policy was formulated, will be explored in order to illustrate the issues, 
which the policy sought to address. Second, we will outline how these issues were 
addressed in the policy, and third, we will touch on the results of the policy. 
In the early 1980’s, Bangladesh was experiencing a series of problems in its 
pharmaceutical and health sector: a large portion of its population had little access to 
modern drugs – in fact, it had been estimated that not more than 15% of the 
population had access to modern pharmaceuticals (Patel 1983, 251). This was related 
to problems in the pharmaceutical distribution system, where drugs were free but not 
widely available in the public system, while the drugs in the private system, though 
more readily available, were not affordable for a big part of the population. The 
public medicinal drug budget was inadequate and there was no effective public 
control over drug prices or dispensing practices in the private market. Furthermore, 
the production capacities of all the pharmaceutical companies in Bangladesh were 
almost exclusively limited to the formulation of drugs34, and the government lacked 
effective quality control supervision. Lastly, a high percentage of imports in the 
pharmaceutical sector drained the government health budget, and interrelated, the 
imports also drained the already limited foreign exchange reserves, thus undermining 
the government’s capacity to improve, for example said health budget (Reich 1994, 
130-132). On a further note, as much as 70% of the annual drug sales consisted of 
“preparations described as therapeutically useless by the British National Formulary 
or the Federal Drug Administration (USA)” (Patel 1983, 251), meaning that a large 
part of the products sold on the pharmaceutical market was of very low quality. At the 
same time, Bangladesh’s production of pharmaceuticals was very much dominated by 
multinational firms, eight of which35 manufactured 75% of all pharmaceutical 
products by value (Reich 1994, 132). However, with General Ershad’s rise to power36 
in 1982, favorable political conditions for a new pharmaceutical policy was created, 
                                                      
34 The formulation of drugs does not include capacities such as the ability to produce 
intermediates and active pharmaceutical ingredients (APIs). Other important capacities could 
be the ability to export drugs and carry out research and development.  
35 Both Reich (1994), Islam (2008), and Patel (1983) mention these 8 multinational firms, but 
without specifying their countries of origin.  Chowdhury does, however, provide us with 
information about the number of foreign companies exporting drugs to Bangladesh in 1981-
82, which gives us a better idea about the presence of international companies in Bangladesh: 
The UK (29 companies), USA (12 companies), India (11 companies), Switzerland (10 
companies), and Germany (9 companies), and the list goes on (Chowdhury, Bangladesh: A 
Tough Battle for a National Drug Policy 1995, 100). 
36 Ershad seized power on March 24th 1982. We will later make an assessment and explore the 
importance of this regime change in our section on the Bangladeshi political settlement.  
as Reich argues, because “Moments of regime transition provide an important 
opportunity for policy reform” (Reich 1995, 54), and consequently, a report made by 
the newly established Expert Committee on Drugs led to the birth of the Bangladesh 
Drug (Control) Ordinance of 198237 (Reich 1994, 132-133). Extraordinary in this 
relation, was that the Expert Committee only consisted of experts on the subject; no 
civil servants, government officials or representatives from the big MNC 
pharmaceutical companies were involved in the formulation process (Chowdhury, 
Bangladesh: A Tough Battle for a National Drug Policy 1995, 98-99). 
The NDP concentrated on the supply of a limited number of essential drugs38, an 
approach that was recommended by the World Health Organization (Patel 1983, 251), 
and the “policy’s basic strategy was to exclude all non-essential drugs from the 
country, rather than to promote essential drugs in the public sector while allowing the 
coexistence of a broader private market”39 (Reich 1994, 132). In this way, the NDP 
differed from an earlier attempt to promote essential drugs from 1978, which did not 
permeate the private sector. This was important as the private sector accounted for 
90% of drug consumption before the policy. (Hye 1988, 214-215). The NDP intended 
to deal with this by being a uniform policy for both the private and public sector, and 
it also introduced the use of generic names for the manufacture and sale of 45 primary 
care drugs, while it eliminated product patents and limited the use of process patents 
(Chowdhury, Bangladesh: A Tough Battle for a National Drug Policy 1995, 103-104). 
Another goal was to eliminate harmful, useless and non-essential drugs from the 
market (Hye 1988, 215), and the drug policy also sought to promote local 
manufacture and to restrict foreign firms within Bangladesh, for example, 
multinationals were not allowed to import drugs similar to the ones being produced by 
local firms (Reich 1995, 64). Thus, the policy promoted the protection of local 
producers, self-reliance and an attitude of defiance against multinationals, which 
Reich labels “a stance of economic nationalism”, and consequently both the 
international pharmaceutical industry and several foreign governments40 opposed the 
policy. Furthermore, “it was one of the principal objectives of the NDP to ensure 
                                                      
37 Which was promulgated to implement the National Drug Policy (NDP) 
38 A list of 150 essential drugs and a supplementary list of 100 specialized drugs were 
established (Chowdhury, Bangladesh: A Tough Battle for a National Drug Policy 1995, 103). 
39 The act banned about 1700 drugs from production or sale (Reich 1994, 132) 
40 Ambassadors from the United States, West Germany, the United Kingdom, and the 
Netherlands all expressed their displeasure with the policy (Reich 1995, 64) 
standard manufacturing practices for drug manufacturers” (Islam 2008, 24). 
Specifically, the policy contained 16 criteria that were to serve as guidelines for the 
pharmaceutical sector, and while several of these criteria are related to specific drugs, 
some of the criteria show clearly how the policy was seeking to promote domestic 
production by minimizing the capacity of the multinationals. Beneath we have 
displayed criteria 12, 15, and 16 to illustrate this last point: 
“12. The importing of a drug which is the same or one produced in the country, or a 
close substitute for it, may not be imported, as a measure of protection for the local 
industry. However, if local production is far short of need, this condition may be 
relaxed in some cases […]  
15. No foreign brands may be manufactured under license in any factory in 
Bangladesh if the same or similar products are available/manufactured in 
Bangladesh, as this leads to unnecessarily high prices and payment of royalties. In 
the light of this policy, all existing licensing agreements should be re- viewed. 
16. No multinational company without their own factory in Bangladesh will be 
allowed to market their products after manufacturing them in another factory in 
Bangladesh on a toll basis.” (Chowdhury, Bangladesh: A Tough Battle for a National 
Drug Policy 1995, 102) 
Despite this “nationalistic” element of the policy, the domestic pharmaceutical 
industry also opposed it at first, and for example the Bangladesh Medical Association 
(BMA) was a vocal opponent, for example criticizing the lack of consultation with the 
BMA in the creation of the policy and the methods used to review the drugs on the 
market (Reich 1995, 64-65). Much of the domestic opposition was channeled by the 
MNC’s, who were lobbying the political elite, media and newspapers to further their 
own agenda (Chowdhury, Bangladesh: A Tough Battle for a National Drug Policy 
1995, 106-108).  
The policy was, however, supported by other groups of society: According to Reich, 
the policy embodied a populist strategy to appeal to Bangladesh’s rural poor through 
reducing prices of essential drugs, and at the same time, the policy “created a 
political alliance with one sector of local industry and also with a number of 
prominent left intellectuals” (Reich 1995, 64). As the policy was also supported by 
some international agencies41 and NGOs, it also achieved some international 
legitimacy (Reich 1995, 64-65). In turn though, despite embodying key elements of 
reforms recommended by The World Bank, this international institution opposed the 
policy in relation to the heavy government intervention in market activities, which the 
policy emphasized (Reich 1995, 60). The endurance of the policy came to depend on 
converting some of these initial opponents into supporters, and in that situation, 
Ershad made some compromises to the policy’s initial design42. Furthermore, as the 
policy’s benefits of increased local production became clear, the domestic 
pharmaceutical industry had reversed its initial opposition to the policy by 1986 
(Reich 1995, 65), and “The economic benefits of the drug policy to the Bangladesh 
private sector created an important source of political support for the policy’s 
continuity” (Reich 1994, 135).      
While several reports have differed in their assessments of the drug policy, some 
common conclusions have been made, according to Reich: For example, most groups 
have agreed that the policy succeeded in achieving the goals of eliminating the 
importation, sale, and production of dangerous and useless drugs. It is also commonly 
accepted that the policy achieved in reducing the cost of essential drugs and led to 
savings for consumers, government, and the foreign exchange reserves. Furthermore, 
significant control was achieved over increases in drug prices during the 1980’s, 
whilst the policy also clearly succeeded in promoting domestic production43. Lastly it 
is commonly acknowledged that the policy provided a great boost to the local 
pharmaceutical industry, which adapted to the new local circumstances and benefits, 
and gained a much larger share of the domestic pharmaceutical market. Despite these 
notable gains, there was nonetheless still a high dependency on foreign supplies, 
especially raw materials (Reich 1994, 134-135). However, major problems remained 
in the access to the essential pharmaceuticals for those most in need, for example due 
to drug shortages caused by governmental budgetary constraints and inadequate 
supply control systems, and the presence of banned drugs on the black market 
persisted (Reich 1994, 135). Problems in the availability of scientific information and 
                                                      
41 Such as the WHO and international consumer organizations 
42 Such as permitting some banned products back on the market and extending the time 
periods for implementation 
43 ”Nationally owned companies produced 35% of all drugs (by value) in 1981, rising to a 
high of 67% in 1988, then declining to just over 60% in 1989 and 1990” (Reich 1994, 134)  
in the incentive structure of the dispensing systems also continued be a concern for 
the improvement of prescribing patterns (Reich 1994, 136), and problems persisted in 
the quality of pharmaceutical products available in Bangladesh and in the efficacy of 
its quality control (Reich 1994, 137). On a related note, administrative problems also 
occurred in the implementation of price controls, and some actual market prices were 
found to exceed the official prices (Reich 1994, 138).  Concluding upon these results 
of the drug policy, Reich argues that it probably succeeded more clearly as an 
industrial policy, as it promoted the economic condition of local manufacturers 
through a hidden subsidy, while its impact on improving the health status of the local 
population was more ambiguous (Reich 1994, 138). Furthermore, Reich argues:     
“Questions could also be raised about its success as industrial policy, considering the 
quality problems of domestically produced drugs and the overall strategic desirability 
of promoting the pharmaceutical industry versus, say, the textile industry in 
Bangladesh” (Reich 1994, 138). 
Reich does argue, though, that Bangladesh, along with Sri Lanka and the Philippines, 
stand out as successful instances of pharmaceutical reform (Reich 1995, 60). Ahmed 
et al. (2013) argue that the policy has created favorable market conditions, which has 
helped Bangladesh to move from a dependence on foreign-made drugs to achieve a 
vibrant national production capacity for essential drugs at an affordable price. This 
has resulted in a more than 100-fold growth in yearly drug sales during the 30 years 
up to 2011, while Bangladesh also exports generic drugs to around 70 countries today 
(Ahmed et al. 2013, 1750). The authors further argue that the “level and extent of 
actions of the drug manufacturers and unqualified providers were led mainly by 
market forces, being neither planned nor tightly regulated” (Ahmed et al. 2013, 
1751).  
In this section we have outlined some of the major problems in Bangladesh’s 
pharmaceutical sector before the National Drug Policy of 1982. We have dealt with 
how the drug policy sought to promote a limited number of essential drugs, and how 
it promoted the local manufacture by protecting local producers from international 
competition. Furthermore, we have touched upon, which actors made up both the 
opposition to and the support for the policy, and finally, we have brought into the 
picture some assessments of the policy’s results. Having investigated this, we will 
now turn to a political settlements analysis of Bangladesh.  
 
6.3 A Political Settlements Analysis of Bangladesh 
The foregoing section of this analysis established how the events unfolded, which led 
to the inception of Bangladesh’s National Drug Policy of 1982. In the latter part of the 
previous section we furthermore highlighted that the Bangladeshi pharmaceutical 
industry has grown, and today is capable of producing for its domestic market.  
But whilst we have underlined that the Bangladeshi pharmaceutical industry took off 
because of the NDP in 1982, we have not become much wiser on why the sector 
developed at this particular time. The question thus remains, under which conditions 
and for which reasons did the economic development of this sector take place during 
this period? 
We will now commence our political settlements analysis of Bangladesh, with the 
intention of addressing this question. It will also be necessary to outline the periods 
leading up to the development in the pharmaceutical sector in order to have proper 
knowledge about the context in which this development happened.  We will 
demonstrate that a political settlements analysis provides such an understanding of 
why and under which conditions an industrial policy can be implemented, hence also 
offering insight to the economic development of this specific sector. We will review 
the political settlements aspects of four different phases (time periods) in this analysis, 
and latterly in each of these sections we will relate the findings to the pharmaceutical 
industry in Bangladesh.  
6.3.1 A Historical Review of the Political Settlement in Bangladesh 
In Khan’s historical review of the political settlement in Bangladesh (Khan 2013), he 
applies the various sub-system configurations of a political settlement to the country 
specific case of Bangladesh. His goal with this analysis is to map out the political 
settlement evolution, showcasing how it has transformed, but also how the 
characteristics of each of these political settlements have resulted in different 
outcomes44. He divides this evolution into four broad phases, starting with the pre-
                                                      
44 These outcomes are varying in their traits, but seek to explain how the political settlement 
in a broad sense has influenced the Bangladeshi society. In some periods Khan highlights 
independence period (where Bangladesh still was a part of Pakistan) up until present 
day. In this thorough mapping of the political settlement, Khan covers the three 
different sub-systems; the political, bureaucratic and economic sub-system throughout 
these periods. To visualize and organize these periods, we have modified a chart from 
Khan 2013, which is attached in the appendix (Appendix 1).  
6.3.2 Phase One – Military Authoritarianism and the Emergence of Competitive 
Clientelism 
Post its colonial independence, Pakistan was divided into two sections, West and 
East-Pakistan (later Bangladesh)45. In Khan’s analysis of this period he characterizes 
the political sub-system initially as vulnerable patriomonialism, this was mainly due 
to the fact that the political organizations in East-Pakistan had little influence and 
limited holding power in the political arena. A democratic structure was initially setup 
between Mohammed Ali Jinnah (who became Governor-General) and Liaquat Ali 
Khan (who became Prime Minister), both members of the Western Pakistani Muslim 
League (Infoplease 2013). The Muslim League greatly represented the democratic 
structure in Pakistan during this period, in turn limiting the influence of East-Pakistani 
political organizations. Much of the holding power and the political administrative 
power was thus located in West-Pakistan and for example much of the operational 
power and the bureaucratic workings were placed in West-Pakistan46. Nonetheless the 
Bangladeshi political organizations were cohesive and had strong support during this 
period. Khan specifically remarks in this context, that the mobilization capabilities of 
the Bangladeshi political organizations were effective in reaching out to the broader 
Eastern Pakistani population (Khan 2013, 27).   
Khan categorizes the bureaucratic sub-system as a divided bureaucratic authority 
during this era, because even though the bureaucratic sub-system had established high 
operational capabilities in the West, the Bangladeshi political actors sought to 
                                                                                                                                                            
economic outcomes and in others more politically significant outcomes, the points is simply 
to underline how the political settlement characteristics have influenced the society as a 
whole.  
45 This division occurred when the former British colony of India gained its independence. 
During the colonial era, The British Raj spanned from Afghanistan to contemporary 
Bangladesh. Secession of these territories was based on ethnicity and religion, where a 
Muslim majority was present both in West and East-Pakistan.  
46 In the aftermath of the British India, many of the top-bureaucrats moved to West-Pakistan 
rather than Bangladesh, thus much of the administrative capabilities were placed in this 
section of the country (Khan, 2013: 25) 
challenge the top horizontal structures of the Pakistani political settlement. Political 
instability grew with the increasing mobilization capabilities of the Bangladeshi 
political organizations. What one must take into account in this regard is, that a large 
percentage (54%) of the total Pakistani population was situated in the East, but was 
politically underrepresented with the West dominating the political agenda (Khan 
2013, 24-26). But while East-Pakistan had a strong mobilization of its political 
organizations, they lacked a body of economic organizations that could influence 
politics. This came to show in that East-Pakistan was not able to gain influence upon 
the political settlement in such a way that the economic policies also targeted the 
Eastern part of the country, this naturally stemmed from the political 
underrepresentation and the lack of economic organizations in the East able to 
influence the political agenda (Khan 2013, 26). Even though political instability grew, 
many economic policies were pursued (benefiting West-Pakistan) because of the 
strong operational equilibrium of the bureaucratic sub-system of the West. According 
to Khan it was difficult during this phase to find a democratic recipe that would favor 
both the East and West of Pakistan, he notes: “A decade of constitutional discussions 
failed to achieve a power-sharing formula between the two wings that would satisfy 
both the dominant elites of the West and the aspiring elites of the East.” (Khan 2013, 
33) 
A fair democratic solution was never found, whilst the “asymmetries in the economic, 
political and organizational capabilities of the two wings made a constitutional 
settlement virtually impossible” (Khan 2013, 33). As a result came the military coup 
by Ayub Khan in 195847, where martial law was imposed. This in turn spurred a 
period of competitive clientelism, where the ruling coalition saw very little support 
from the elites and population alike, this from both the West and East. Discontent 
with the regime became apparent with increasing numbers of demonstrations, whilst 
the political support was diminishing in the West and further deteriorating in the East. 
                                                      
47 The 1958 coup d’état is said to have been backed by The U.S. government. Though we do 
not have much basis in this report to evaluate on themes related to The Cold War, it stands 
quite apparent that The U.S. backing the military regime in Pakistan had several 
repercussions on the Bangladeshi society. In the next section we will highlight that the 
independent subsequent Bangladeshi military regimes for some time abided to more socialist 
ideologies, this might have been a response to the U.S. backed Pakistani regime. (Wilcox, 
1965)  
The increased competitive clientelist traits of the Pakistani political sub-system in turn 
diminished the effectiveness of the bureaucratic sub-system and hence operational 
equilibrium to pursue economic political goals was virtually lost (Khan 2013, 34-36). 
It is important to highlight that it was necessary for the Ayub Khan military regime to 
incorporate Western Pakistani political forces, who still had influence upon the 
bureaucratic sub-system and backing from a large part of the Western Pakistani 
population. Furthermore, a strong section of capitalist elites had emerged in the West 
as a result of the early industrial policies that benefited West-Pakistan (Khan 2013, 
34). The further favoring of the West Pakistani society deteriorated the political 
stability to such a degree that mass-uprisings occurred.  Crackdowns on 
demonstrations in both the East and West were of a violent nature, and it is within this 
bloody constellation that the Bangladeshi nation was born.  
6.3.2.1 Phase one and the health sector 
The limited economic development that Bangladesh witnessed during this period had 
its consequences on the broader Bangladeshi society as well. There is little data to be 
found on key indicators from the health sector from this period. That being said, the 
life expectancy at the end of this period (1970) was only 44 (today 66), and the infant 
mortality rate in 1975 was 233 children per 1,000 live births (today 54) (Pose og 
Samuels 2010). It is evident that building a pharmaceutical industry in Bangladesh 
during this period had been an impossible task, with political turmoil characterizing 
the period and politics mainly dealing with issues in West-Pakistan. Furthermore, it 
stands apparent that the bureaucratic sub-system was being wielded as a political tool 
by the Western Pakistani political organization during this period. For this reason, not 
much development either addressing growth or vulnerable sectors in Bangladesh 
unfolded during this phase. The strong prioritization of Western Pakistani political 
agendas, meant that no economic capabilities were established in Bangladesh to build 
a pharmaceutical industry, but in general the health sector was simply overlooked in 
Bangladesh during this era.  
6.3.3 Phase Two – Dominant Party Rule and Competitive Clientelism 
The military regime of Pakistan allowed the first democratic elections to be held in 
1970, where the largest political organization of East-Pakistan, The Awami League 
won the majority of seats. The military junta did not accept the results and massive 
protests broke out in the capital of Bangladesh, Dhaka. Nor did the junta allow the 
proposition of separating the two nations, an agenda that was heavily backed by The 
Awami League. The Bangladeshi Liberation War broke out as result of The Awami 
Leauge’s victory and nine months of combat and fighting pursued. The Bangladeshi 
exile government was set-up in Calcutta, and India provided economic, military and 
diplomatic support to the Bangladeshi government-in-exile. Indian military forces 
eventually intervened in the conflict, and together with Bengali forces they stood 
victorious in December 1971, and thus Bangladesh gained its independence48. With 
broad legitimacy from the people, the Awami League headed by Sheikh Mujibur 
Rahman (Mujib), took office in December 1971 (Khan 2013, 37). 
The large Awami League dominated the political sphere in this period, Khan 
characterizes this period as constrained patrimonialism, because lower actors within 
the dominant party were the only ones able to challenge power. The Awami League 
gained its power from distributing power to many groupings of society, and only few 
political organizations were excluded from the political umbrella constituting the 
political sub-system. This constellation enabled stability, but many political actors 
had backed The Awami League to ensure access to the new political arrangements 
that were to emerge. In truth the many political organizations backing the Awami 
League did not share the same ideological values, but wanted to take part in this new 
distribution of power that naturally would occur at the inception of this newly 
founded country (Khan 2013, 37-38).  
It was a political settlement structure that was not meant to last. The core of the 
problem was rooted in the limited resources that were available in Bangladesh at the 
time. With so many groupings and political organizations included under the political 
umbrella, there simply were not enough resources and rents to allocate between these 
many political actors (Khan 2013, 38). Much of the industrial capacity had been 
located in West-Pakistan, and Bangladesh had seen limited development in creating 
                                                      
48 We have highlighted India’s role in this context to showcase wherefrom external political 
influence might have derived from. The second phase of the Bangladeshi political settlement 
was characterized by a socialist ideology as Khan points out, but wherefrom did these 
socialist trends derive from? Opposition toward the U.S. backed Pakistani military regime 
might indicate, that Bangladesh was repelled by American ideology, whilst the more socialist 
Indian society was supporting Bangladesh during this period. Unfortunately we do not have 
the basis in this report to make a true evaluation of whether this speculation is true, though we 
feel obliged to at least give an indicative suggestion about where the Bangladeshi ideological 
trends might stem from.  
an environment that would benefit them economically. In our chapter of theory, we 
discussed the issue of resource scarcity, an issue that characterized Bangladesh during 
this period. No tax-revenue could be generated, as the population lived well under the 
poverty-line, and there were no big firms operating in Bangladesh. Furthermore, The 
Awami League was based on an ideology of socialism, and various groupings within 
the political organization itself sought to nationalize the Bangladeshi economy (Khan 
2013, 38-39). Khan notes in this respect, that the advocacy by these actors within the 
Awami League to further a process of nationalizing the Bangladeshi economy, was an 
attempt to create an environment for greater rent-capturing (Khan 2013, 38). If there 
were no resources and rents to distribute between the domestic and political elite, then 
it was necessary to create such a source of revenue. From early on this nationalization 
process took off, and by 1972 the Bangladeshi public sector ownership accumulated 
to 92% of the Bangladeshi economy (Khan 2013, 44). 
The nationalization process meant that new resources49 could be allocated to 
maintaining a ruling coalition, but the issue of allocating these (still few resources) 
across a broad spectrum of political organization was still inherent. Eventually 
political instability started to shake the political support toward the Awami League, 
and the broad political umbrella could not last, Mujib thus sought to further 
consolidate his holding power and a one-party state was instated in 1975 (Khan 2013, 
39).  
The intrinsic problem of few resources nonetheless remained, and Khan argues that 
the one-party authoritarian structure further deteriorated the possibilities of creating 
new economic sectors. The issue with a one-party state is that “If the distribution of 
rents between internal factions depends on the decisions of a supreme leader, all 
factional leaders have to be confident of their access to the supreme leader, and the 
leader has to have sufficient authority to impose decisions once taken.” (Khan 2013, 
42). Furthermore, Khan argues that the informal institutional structure, deriving from 
the still infant bureaucratic system and many political organizations seeking to gain 
holding power, meant that “there were no well-defined criteria of allocating 
resources across organizations of varying size and power” (Khan 2013, 39) 
                                                      
49 Mainly within cotton and jute production industries. 
The rent and resource capturing during this period, was so severe, that Khan deems 
the economic sub-system as a cover for primitive accumulation during this era. Khan 
further adds that, “the types of rents that political organizations were creating in 
Bangladesh during this period were largely unproductive and purely redistributive 
rents.” (Khan 2013, 45). Few industrial capabilities were established in this period, 
and learning-by-doing upgrades in the economy were not taking place.  
Adding together the various issues that were integral to the political settlement during 
this period; few resources to allocate, a weak bureaucratic system, competitive 
clientelism challenging the ruling coalition’s holding power and the general 
discontent with a one-party state. These institutionally founded problems eventually 
lead to demonstrations and deeper economic crisis, wherefore a revolt by young army 
officers wiped out the top leadership of the Awami League in 1975. 
6.3.3.1 The second phase and the pharmaceutical industry of Bangladesh 
Analyzing the second phase of the Bangladeshi political settlement tells us a great 
deal about the health sector in Bangladesh at the time, and provides important insight 
to why the pharmaceutical industry eventually emerged.  
The political ideological environment in the 1970’s plays an important role in 
explaining the health care situation that was innate in Bangladesh at the time. The 
socialist ideology ordained that medicines and drugs were to be free of charge, but at 
the same time, the limited productive capabilities meant that such a distribution was 
virtually impossible. The nationalization of industries furthermore limited the 
capability and incentives for private economic organizations to produce 
pharmaceuticals. The desperate need for a source of rents to allocate between the 
political elites, which basically covered a wide political umbrella, meant that a 
nationalization process was inevitable. Nationalizing these industries was not 
necessarily the root of the problem, it was rather the limited economic growth that this 
process generated. The heavy rent capturing being undertaken, meant that industrial 
and economic capabilities were not efficiently being created. The divided bureaucratic 
authority and the competitive clientilist nature of the political settlement, meant that 
the operational equilibrium to promote any sort of economic development for the 
pharmaceutical industry during this period was very weak. The weak operational 
equilibrium of the bureaucratic and political sub-systems further entailed that 
providing healthcare to the general population was a difficult administrative task. In 
general though, the formal institutions to promote a ‘socialist planning’ were weakly 
enforced, which partially also derived from the fact that actors integral to the ruling 
coalition did not share the same ideological mindset as the top-officers (Khan 2013, 
37-45). Let us now turn to the third phase of the political settlement in Bangladesh, 
which covers the period from 1975 to 1990. During this phase the National Drug 
Policy (NDP) of 1982 was implemented, why our following analytical section will 
play an important role to understanding (in a political settlements context) how the 
pharmaceutical industry emerged in Bangladesh. 
6.3.4 Phase Three: Authoritarian Clientelism and ‘Economic Liberalization’ 
After the Mujib regime was overthrown in 1975 a series of coups and counter-coups 
followed, with General Zia ur Rahman eventually emerging as supreme leader of 
Bangladesh the same year. Rahman officially became president in 1977 forming the 
Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP), establishing a formal multi-party system with 
the introduction of electoral competition. Informally it was understood though, by the 
various political organizations, that the top job of Rahman’s position was not to be 
contended, though Rahman “offered inclusion on terms that were proportional to the 
holding power of the organization that the political entrepreneur could bring into the 
ruling coalition” (Khan 2013, 48). Furthermore, political organizations and parties 
were allowed to contest elections against the BNP, though it remained that the 
leadership position of Rahman was to be uncontested.  
This mix of inclusion and exclusion, where political organizations were formally 
allowed to engage in the institutional setup, but could informally not seek the ultimate 
ruling power of the top-position, characterizes the political settlement at the time as 
authoritarian clientelist. Competitive clientelism was still integral to the system, but 
the institutional framework was ultimately one of authoritarian nature (Khan 2013, 
47-49). What made this institutional setup distinct in relation to the Mujib regime, 
was a broad understanding in the political sub-system, that if external political actors 
played by the rules of the game, they too could be included under ‘appropriate terms’ 
to capture rents (Khan 2013, 49). This is an important incentive for the political actors 
to maintain political stability. Defining the appropriate terms of inclusion during this 
period was nonetheless a difficult objective, Rahman and General Ershad, who 
succeeded him, sought to identify the true holding power of the various political 
organizations. Specifically Khan notes “it was also necessary to check their (the 
political organizations) ambitions by encouraging countervailing political 
organizations” (Khan 2013, 49). This was done by “creating new rural voices 
through ‘decentralization’” (Khan 2013, 49), which basically entailed that the 
Rahman and Ershad regimes sought to bypass established political leaders, “by 
creating a new constituency of political leaders in the villages who would be cheaper 
to accommodate within the ruling coalition.” (Khan 2013, 34)50 
This bypassing gained much unpopularity from the ruling elite though and had a 
limited effect in boosting political stability, according to Khan 51. It was the only 
tactic at Rahman and later Ershad’s disposal to determine the price of political 
inclusion and in turn determine how resources were to be allocated between the elites 
(Khan 2013, 49-50). Whilst this informal institutional setup ensures that new aspirant 
actors can gain influence in the political settlement, it remains a very turbulent 
method of allocating resources. The authoritative institutional structure was 
unsustainable as one could imagine, when competitors and other groupings are 
allowed to organize and thus contend the holding power of the ruling coalition, and 
both Rahman (1981)52 and Ershad (1990) were eventually overthrown.  
The political institutional structure did, however, generate a more complying 
bureaucratic structure that had a greater operational equilibrium to pursue political 
goals. Furthermore, the inclusion of external political actors into the political 
settlement entailed that a gradual move toward privatization of the economic sector 
could happen. Allocating resources and rents on appropriate terms, meant that a 
restructuring of the economic sector could be witnessed. This simultaneously entailed 
that entrepreneurs53 had greater incentives to find areas, where new rents could be 
                                                      
50 This was a tactic first innovated during the Pakistani military junta era. 
51 Khan points to one example of this ‘decentralization’ process:  “Even so, these strategies, 
particularly Ershad’s attempt to create a new class of political representatives in the newly 
created ‘upazillas’ (a tier of government constituting a small number of villages), was 
strongly opposed by urban political organizers.”(Khan, 2013: 49) 
52 Rahman was assassinated in 1981 after political infighting between army officials, with 
Ershad taking power in 1982.  
53 Not much has been mentioned in the previous two phases about economic organizations or 
business entrepreneurs, which mainly has to do with the economic capabilities being very 
limited during these periods, and at the same time many of the economic sectors were state 
enterprises. During the third phase a growing number of businessmen were becoming 
captured (Khan 2013, 51). The legacy of the unproductive and heavy rent-capturing 
from the previous economic institutional structure meant though, that the Bangladeshi 
economic organizations had very low capabilities. This in turn destined the 
Bangladeshi entrepreneurs to rely on low-technological industrial sectors, for example 
the garments industry. 
The competitiveness between the political actors during this era, lies at the heart of 
explaining, how gradual changes in the economic sector could take place in the third 
phase. Rahman and Ershad’s tactics of checking the holding power and only allowing 
the proportionate inclusion of political actors, according to their relative holding 
power, meant that much rent allocation took place during these periods. Turning back 
to our chapter of theory, we mentioned that capitalists are reluctant to take any 
unnecessary risks when it comes to investments in developing countries54. In the 
Bangladeshi case, carrying the legacy from the nationalization process meant that 
many of the political elites were also the capitalists of this society55. But because the 
status quo had in this period been disrupted (checking of holding power), these 
political elites had to take the risk and seek new areas of economic development to 
generate new revenues of rent-capturing. Aspiring entrepreneurs could provide the 
introduction of these new sectors, why many business-government links were 
generated in this period. With their political connections, the political elite could 
ensure that government backing was directed toward their new investment 
opportunities (Khan 2013, 51-52). However as Khan notes, these entrepreneurs56 and 
economic organizations are only likely to receive commitment and backing from the 
political elite if they are within striking distance to achieving competitiveness, thus a 
                                                                                                                                                            
established, some of which were earlier civil servants or political elites. We will later in this 
section highlight some of these business entrepreneurs.  
54 This aspect was closely related to the fact that the capitalists in developing countries are 
already reaping benefits from the status quo.  
55 This was probably the case, because few actors in Bangladesh had the economic 
capabilities to start their own ventures or businesses, apart from the political elite who were 
relatively wealthy. The legacy from the two previous regimes had furthermore not created an 
environment for a body of businessmen to emerge.  
56 One of these aspiring entrepreneurs was a former civil servant, whose relation to Rahman 
ensured that he was heavily involved in the take off of the Garments industry. The South 
Korean conglomerate Daewoo engaged in a partnership with this civil servant’s company 
Desh. A transfer of technologies and tacit production knowledge took place from Daewoo to 
Desh (Khan, 2013: 70).  
certain degree of establishment57 had to be in place before the political elite were 
willing to take the risk.  
Interrelated, Khan notes that for the ‘right’ form of development to take place and to 
truly build economic competitive capabilities, a long-term developmental outlook is 
needed, which the authoritative institutional structure during this era could ensure. 
Economic sectors must take on the challenge of learning-by-doing to build tacit and 
technological knowledge, a hurdle that is difficult to overcome without governmental 
support, especially for un-established sectors58 (Khan 2013, 52).  
Important also to highlight in this respect, is the liberal economic environment that 
emerged in the latter part of the 1970’s59. The moves toward a liberal economic 
environment are broadly twofold; for one Rahman sought to break away from the 
socialist period, as socialist planning had not proved successful and bore the legacy of 
his predecessors. Second, the liberal economic motives partially also stemmed from 
international opinion influencing and informing on economic policies which were of 
this nature (Khan 2013, 52). Khan notes though that the de-nationalization of 
industries mainly took place under the Ershad regime, where the New Industrial 
Policy of 1982 played a pivotal role. The policy basically sought to induce a liberal 
and private market, relying on export-oriented growth and down-sizing the public 
sector (Haq 2008, 19).  It is also worth considering whether the authoritative structure 
(heavily influenced by the military) during this period was forced to consider ongoing 
events in the Southeast Asian region at the time. The Vietnam War clearly had its 
effects on neighboring countries (directly or indirectly), why one could speculate 
                                                      
57 This establishment implies that these economic organization already had some capabilities 
in their means of production or had been engaged in manufacturing previously.   
58 Economic organizations are for example also reluctant to invest in new sectors if they are 
unsure, whether there will be a new political regime tomorrow. The authoritative military 
regimes of Ershad and Rahman ensured a somewhat stable political outlook for the future.  
59 In respect to liberal economic trends and developing countries, the Structural Adjustment 
Programs (SAP) are worth of mentioning. The SAP’s were promoted by The World Bank 
based on neo-liberal economic values, John Williamson coined the term of The Washington 
Consensus in attempt to define these neo-liberal economic trends. Broadly speaking these 
trends incorporated privatization of state enterprises, liberalizing trade and finance sectors, 
promoting fiscal policy of tax-revenues and supporting judiciary of property rights. What 
made the SAP’s distinct from earlier loan-programs was the heavy influence The World Bank 
demanded in formulating conditions to receiving these loans (Mosley, Harrigan, & Toye, 
1991) (Cypher & Dietz, 2010). These economic liberal trends are usually interpreted in a shift 
of the political inspiration, the role of Ronald Reagan and Margaret Thatcher is typically 
addressed in this context (Bull & Bøås, 2010). 
whether American influences (who were heavily present in Southeast Asia during this 
period) spilled on to the Bangladeshi political elite and Rahman & Ershad 
themselves60.  
Let us now turn our attention toward, how the political settlement characteristics 
during this period enabled the domestic pharmaceutical industry to emerge. It was 
during this phase that the 1982 NDP was formulated and implemented. 
6.3.4.1 Phase three and the pharmaceutical industry 
The de-nationalization process that commenced in the late 70’s played a pivotal role 
in providing an economic environment, which induced the emergence of new 
industrial sectors. The global liberal political economic environment partially plays a 
role in this respect, though Rahman’s liberal economic preferences are probably more 
explanatory to why liberal economics were pursued61. The backing of the political 
elite for this de-nationalization process plays an equally important role, where they 
saw new opportunities arise to capture new rents (Khan, The Political Settlement, 
Growth and Technical Progress in Bangladesh 2013, 101). The authoritative 
clientelist characteristics of the political settlement thus stand explanatory to new 
economic institutional trends during this phase. The authoritative institutional 
structure of the Bangladeshi society, meant that new policies could be pursued 
without great opposition. The clientelist competitive characteristics of the political 
settlement during this era pitted political organizations against each other, and much 
focus was thus channeled into rent-capturing rather than taking a stance against the 
authoritarian regime. This in turn gave the authoritarian regime greater freedom to 
pursue the 1982 NDP. 
Furthermore, the Expert Committee who drafted the NDP of 1982, did not include 
any civil servants, who might have had independent agendas in formulating the 
policy. So whilst the operational equilibrium and effectiveness of the bureaucratic 
sub-system during this phase was questionable, the NDP of 1982 rather relied on an 
                                                      
60 Unfortunately we do not have any empirical evidence backing this claim, though it was an 
element we wished to highlight for the reader to take into consideration. Furthermore, on the 
subject of U.S. - Bangladeshi relations, immediately after Bangladesh’s independence The 
U.S. pledged 300 million USD in foreign aid. (Newsom, 1972)  
61 Rahman’s opinion could naturally have stemmed from international opinion, but one should 
also take into account the socialist period that preceded Rahman.   
external committee to the political settlement62. The policy’s formulation and 
prioritization of domestic economic entrepreneurs stands as a key component of the 
policy, which created incentives and an economic environment that induced the 
creation of the pharmaceutical industry in Bangladesh. In our interpretation, this 
meant that economic organizations within the pharmaceutical sector that were within 
striking distance of achieving competitiveness could further evolve. One of these 
economic organizations was the company of Square Pharmaceuticals Limited63. 
Square started as a small pharmacy partnership between a group of businessmen, 
where Samson H. Chowdhury sat as director of the company for several decades. 
Chowdhury, educated in Calcutta, India, returned to Bangladesh in the 1950’s and 
established Square in 1958 (Square Pharmaceuticals Limited 2014). In 1974 Square 
had established a technical collaboration with Janssen Pharmaceuticals of Belgium, 
where a transfer of technology and production took place. Thus previously to the 
1982 Drug Policy, Square had already started building its competitive capabilities 
(Square Pharmaceuticals Limited 2014). In this respect Square stood in a good 
position to gain from the 1982 Drug Policy, which inherently favored domestic 
producers, giving them a competitive advantage. Already by 1985 Square had 
achieved market-share leadership, both in relation to domestic and multinational 
companies (Square Pharmaceuticals Limited 2014).  
As noted in the chapter on theory, Khan stresses that for the ruling coalition of the 
political and domestic capitalist elites to maintain stability, they must in some 
instances (also) allocate resources to the most vulnerable areas of society. The ruling 
political elite can gain much legitimacy by addressing issues that are in favor of the 
broader population, and in times of political instability the political elite might strive 
toward responding to the demands by the vulnerable sectors. The health sector in the 
pre-period of the 1982 NDP could in this respect be regarded as a vulnerable section 
of the Bangladeshi society. It is interesting in this respect, that the 1982 NDP was 
formulated right after a regime change had occurred from Rahman to Ershad. In the 
midst of political turmoil, we thus witnessed Ershad addressing issues within the 
                                                      
62 Ershad’s ability to form this expert committee probably lies in the institutionally 
authoritative structure. 
63 Square is the largest (in relation to market share) pharmaceutical company in Bangladesh, 
which produces both for the domestic and foreign export market.  
health sector, which might have occurred because Ershad sought to appeal to popular 
opinion and hence gain legitimacy.  
6.3.5 Phase Four – Competitive Clientelist Democracy 
The authoritative Ershad regime ended in 1990, and an institutionally weak 
democratic system replaced it. The competitive clientelist nature of the political 
settlement had up until this point become so embedded, that any form of ruling 
coalition could only achieve stability by acknowledging the strong political 
organizations of the Bangladeshi society (Khan 2013, 55).  
“The problem (in all developing countries) is that the formal institutions of 
democracy (like any other formal institutions) cannot be fully enforced in a clientelist 
political settlement. There are bound to be informal modifications of the formal rules 
of democracy as a result of the activity of powerful political organizations, so a 
workable democracy has to have informal limits to these modifications to ensure that 
excluded political organizations have a reasonable chance of winning and do not 
therefore engage in excessive violence.” (Khan 2013, 55) 
If any of the ruling coalitions attempted to perpetuate their power, by changing the 
rules of the game (formally or informally), mass opposition would typically break out. 
The two dominant parties The Awami League and BNP have continuously sought to 
“modify the institutional rules of political competition to their advantage” (Khan 
2013, 55), but neither party has had any particular luck or seen any advancement in 
these strategies. So whilst formally a democratic structure has established itself in 
Bangladesh, the strong political organizations are still seeking to disrupt this 
institutional configuration.  
Khan notes in this respect, that maintaining a growth-stability trade-off, has become 
quite a challenge under this institutional configuration of competitive clientelist 
democracy. Political organizations seldomly risk long-term developmental 
perspectives when their political strength and stability are uncertain in the near future. 
With the aggressive nature of the competitive clientelist political settlement, it 
becomes unclear whether the ruling coalition will stay in power, thus short-term 
economic rents are rather established, which ensure the immediate return on 
investments (Khan 2013, 56,71). Khan argues that this has its greatest repercussions 
for infant industries, whilst already established sectors will have better chances of 
development, because once competitiveness has been achieved there is little need for 
special support from political organizations (Khan 2013, 72).  
Somewhat ironically, the development of economic sectors under this democratic 
institutional setup has become less efficient than that of the authoritative regime in the 
previous phase and Khan notes: “This is a paradoxical result for many good 
governance policy recommendations where the assumption is that the introduction of 
democratic institutions will make it easier to enforce growth-enhancing institutions.” 
(Khan 2013, 56) 
The hostile environment between The BNP and The Awami League has continuously 
grown as a result of rent competition and opposing ideological values64. Khan argues 
that a zero-sum environment of holding power has emerged as consequence of this 
political fighting. In turn, the operational equilibrium of the political and bureaucratic 
sub-system to pursue political goals has seriously been weakened, which has damaged 
the growth-stability trade-off (Khan 2013, 66). The ruling coalitions are cautious of 
investing resources for growth with the uncertainty of whether this will induce 
political instability.  
On a related note Bangladesh is currently placed in the top 20 of The Economist’s 
Political Instability Index (The Economist Intelligence Unit 2007) and 29th on the 
Failed State Index (The Fund For Peace 2013)65. Hartals66 have become a political 
tool for the opposition to wield in times of political instability, which seriously hinder 
the production and growth of the Bangladeshi economy. Furthermore, political unrest 
increased in 2013, when several garments factories in the outskirts of Dhaka (Rhana 
Plaza) collapsed, killing several thousands (Butler 2013). The story gained much 
international attention and it has been strongly debated what the role of international 
producers are in this context. Control and monitoring of working facilities has 
                                                      
64 Khaleda Zia (daughter of Rahman) leader of the BNP and Sheikh Hasina leader of the 
Awami Leauge (daughter of Mujib), have been holding office alternatingly. It has been 
discussed that these two figures see themselves as the righteous heirs to the top-position given 
their fathers’ significance in contemporary Bangladeshi history.  
65 One should generally be cautious in using the data from these two indexes, which have 
become a hotly debated topic in the academic scene. We have chosen to include them to 
showcase that it is commonly viewed that political instability is an issue in the Bangladeshi 
society, and thus not only the viewpoint of Khan from a political settlement perspective.  
66 A mass-demonstration wielded by the opposition as political tool. These demonstrations 
effectively stop all production and working in the Bangladeshi society for days or weeks. 
similarly gained traction in this regard, which has put both the BNP and Awami 
League under pressure, there is a demand for better control and union formation 
among workers (Butler 2013). The event has had serious consequences for the 
Bangladeshi economy as the environment for foreign investment has plummeted 
(Khatun 2014). It was expected that Bangladesh would graduate to the 7% GDP 
growth mark, but projections place this number rather at 5 or 6 % (Khatun 2014). 
In our chapter of discussion, we will take these considerations on the current 
characteristics of the political settlement and seek to evaluate what effects this 
institutional configuration will have upon the future economic development of the 
pharmaceutical industry in Bangladesh. In this context our evaluations on the TRIPS 
agreement will play a similarly important role, why the next section of this analysis, 
will firstly provide insight to what the TRIPS agreement fundamentally is about.  
6.4 Bangladesh’s pharmaceutical industry today 
As mentioned in previous sections, the pharmaceutical sector in Bangladesh has 
grown immensely during the last 30 years with the market being valued at US$ 1.78 
bn in 2013 (Business Monitor International 2014, 14). Business Monitor 
International67 reports that Bangladesh has a well-developed local manufacturing 
industry, despite the fact that many domestic manufacturers lack full-spectrum 
generic drug manufacturing capabilities, while “More than 70% of raw materials used 
in the local production of pharmaceuticals are still sourced from abroad” (Business 
Monitor International 2014, 9). The market is predominantly made up of generic 
drugs68, which account for 71.7% of sales, while OTC drugs (21.5%) and patented 
products (6.8%) follow second and third69. It should be noted though that the 
dispensing of OTCs without prescription distorts these calculations (Business Monitor 
International 2014, 45). With regards to innovation, Bangladesh pharmaceutical 
companies only spend approximately 1% of turnover on research and development 
(R&D), on average, compared to 10-15% of pharmaceutical companies in developed 
                                                      
67 Business Monitor International provides quarterly reports on Bangladesh’s pharmaceutical 
sector. 
68 A generic drug contains the same active ingredient as an originator drug, and it is thus a 
bioequivalent medicine. As the patents for innovative originator drugs expire, there is no 
intellectual property protection for these drugs (Business Monitor International 2014, 104). 
69 It is interesting to note in this context that ”generics’ share of the total pharmaceutical 
market value in the US and EU was still less than 18 per cent in the late 2000s”, even though 
the market share of generics has been increasing rapidly (Muzaka 2011, 33). 
countries (Business Monitor International 2014, 62), meaning that the Bangladeshi 
firms lag behind  the companies in developed countries substantially in this area. 
Additionally, “Counterfeit drugs pose a significant problem in Bangladesh because 
authentic pharmaceuticals are often too expensive for those on low incomes”, and 
only the top 20-25 of the more than 300 pharmaceutical companies produce drugs of 
standard quality70 (Business Monitor International 2014, 67-68). Despite the presence 
of many pharmaceutical companies, the market is highly concentrated, with the top 10 
firms making up about 70% of the total market share, while almost all the domestic 
companies do comply with WHO GMP71 standards (Business Monitor International 
2014, 72-73). The prices of pharmaceuticals rank among the lowest in the world 
(Business Monitor International 2014, 69), which is for example because of low labor 
and energy costs (Business Monitor International 2014, 63), and at the same time, the 
“country is also in the advantageous position of being able to produce generic drugs 
and deliver them to other LDCs under the WTO’s TRIPS agreement” (Business 
Monitor International 2014, 74). In this context, exports are increasing rapidly 
(Business Monitor International 2014, 9), and in 2013 the pharmaceutical exports 
amounted to US$ 98.9 mn (Business Monitor International 2014, 28). While the 
pharmaceutical exports are increasing, Bangladesh still imports far more in this 
sector, for example raw materials, and in 2013 the imports amounted to US$ 196 mn, 
meaning that the country had a negative pharmaceutical trade balance of US$ 97.1 mn 
(Business Monitor International 2014, 28). 
Domestically, the “patent liberty allows those on middle incomes to purchase 
pharmaceuticals that would otherwise be too expensive” (Business Monitor 
International 2014, 9). However, in relation to the impending compliance to TRIPS, 
Azam and Richardson argue: 
“It is claimed that domestic generic pharmaceutical producers in developing 
countries like India, Turkey and Bangladesh will be prevented from continuing the 
production of generic pharmaceuticals. A potential consequence of the introduction of 
pharmaceutical patents being that drug prices will increase and the availability of 
                                                      
70 Sub-standard drugs usually lack the correct dose of active ingredient (Business Monitor 
International 2014, 68) 
71 Good manufacturing practice. 
cheap pharmaceuticals for poorer populations will decrease” (Azam og Richardson 
2010, 6) 
6.5 TRIPS  
Before we begin to go into details about TRIPS, we will briefly outline the theoretical 
arguments in relation to intellectual property rights, with special emphasis on their 
importance in the pharmaceutical sector.  
Basically, “property rights aim, in principle, to resolve interpersonal conflict by 
allocating exclusive ownership to specified individuals or groups” in a context of 
finite objects and infinite human wants (Muzaka 2011, 18). But because ideas and 
knowledge are intangible, non-rivalrous in nature72, and thus not scarce, intellectual 
property rights (IPRs) actually creates scarcity and commodification of intellectual 
goods (Muzaka 2011, 18). Some argue that IPRs are “justifiable because they provide 
adequate incentives for the creation of socially valuable intellectual products which 
would not otherwise be produced” (Muzaka 2011, 22), but Muzaka argues that IPRs 
are not necessarily such “indispensable incentives”, as innovation and creativity are 
driven by a range of different motives apart from the economic returns, which IPRs 
can provide (Muzaka 2011, 22). Ha-Joon Chang similarly argues that it is not 
necessary to ‘bribe’ people into inventing new things, and that “a lot of research is 
not motivated by the profit from patent monopoly” (Chang 2007, 124-125). In the 
pharmaceutical sector, IPRs play a very significant role: 
“Proprietary companies maintain that strong intellectual property protection for 
pharmaceuticals is vital for providing incentives for expensive drug innovations. 
Pharmaceutical patents allow companies to recoup the cost of the R&D process over 
time by preventing other proprietary pharmaceutical and generic companies from 
making, manufacturing and selling the drug under patent for a period of twenty 
years” (Muzaka 2011, 28). 
This emphasis on the ability to recoup the costs of the innovation process has a lot to 
do with the lengthy and costly nature of the R&D process in the pharmaceutical sector 
and “the easily codifiable nature of pharmaceutical innovation, which means that 
                                                      
72 ”the ’consumption’ of intangible goods would leave the same quantity and quality of such 
goods to be consumed and enjoyed by others” (Muzaka 2011, 18) in contrast to tangible 
goods. 
competitors can produce the same drug through reverse engineering” (Muzaka 2011, 
24).  
The WTO TRIPS agreement was formally adopted in Marrakesh in 1994, and it 
entered the scene in 1995 (Muzaka 2011, 58-60), basically aiming at “establishing 
strong minimum standards for intellectual property rights (IPRs) including patent 
protection for pharmaceuticals” (Azam og Richardson 2010, 1). While ideas about 
linking trade to IPRs had been contemplated since the 1970’s, the negotiations that 
led to the adoption of TRIPS in 1994 began with the launch of the GATT Uruguay 
Round in 1986 (Muzaka 2011, 38-43), and here, it seems appropriate to identify both 
the proponents and the opponents of TRIPS. Azam and Richardson argue: 
“The TRIPS agreement was the brainchild of an industry coalition of developed 
nations including the United States of America, the European Union and Japan. The 
main impetus for the agreement came from the pharmaceutical, software and 
entertainment industries” (Azam og Richardson 2010, 2) 
The opposition, on the other hand, primarily came from developing countries, whose 
resistance was stifled through pressure and coercion (Muzaka 2011, 54), and 
according to Muzaka, the TRIPS negotiations “proceeded largely in ways conducive 
to the interests of key developed countries and their IP-reliant industries” (Muzaka 
2011, 56) due to the developing countries’ weaker bargaining position (Muzaka 2011, 
55). It was determined at the WTO Ministerial Conference in Doha in 2001 that 
LDC’s are exempted from pharmaceutical patent protection until 2016, which is why 
Bangladesh also has to comply with TRIPS by this year (Yusuf og Alam 2008, 137). 
Turning to some of the specific details of TRIPS, Azam and Richardson provide us 
with useful information: 
“First, TRIPS makes it mandatory for WTO members to provide existing types of IPR 
protection which include patents, copyrights, trademarks, trade secrets, industrial 
designs […] Second, it specifies the substantive content of national IPR legislation, 
such as the extent of coverage, terms of protection, and mechanisms of enforcement. 
Third, it brings national IPR legislation under the coverage of the WTO’s dispute 
settlements procedures, which includes the option of cross-retaliation in cases of non-
compliance” (Azam og Richardson 2010, 3). 
6.6 TRIPS Implications for Bangladesh’s pharmaceutical sector 
One of the important changes that TRIPS will bring about is the introduction of 
product patents, as many countries, before TRIPS, provided only process patents73. 
Muzaka highlights why process patents have given developing countries some leeway 
in the pharmaceutical industry: 
“Essentially, process patents do not prevent the manufacture of patented products by 
a different process, such as reverse engineering, where a process or method different 
from that which was invented (and patented) is used. Developing countries that have 
substantial generic pharmaceutical sectors were able to support their development 
through national and international IP laws that allowed them the flexibility to protect 
pharmaceutical products and processes only partially, if at all” (Muzaka 2011, 35) 
However, when Bangladesh, and other LDC’s in WTO, have to implement the TRIPS 
agreement, the freedom to rely on imitated technology and to manufacture and sell 
generic versions of on-patent pharmaceutical products for domestic consumption and 
for export to other LDC’s is no longer an option (Azam og Richardson 2010, 5) 
(Business Monitor International 2014, 26). There is, however, still a way to authorize 
the generic production and export (to LDC’s) of patented medicines, namely the use 
of compulsory licenses74, but ”for fear of sending negative signals to foreign investors 
about their commitment to protecting private property and providing a business-
friendly environment”, governments tend not to use this option lightly (Muzaka 2011, 
36). Furthermore, the use of compulsory licenses is limited by a series of procedural 
requirements of TRIPS (Muzaka 2011, 36). Thus, TRIPS limits and delays the use of 
generics, and fences off the markets of proprietary pharmaceutical companies 
(Muzaka 2011, 36), and “Today, the options for supporting or strengthening generic 
pharmaceutical sectors are rather limited for developing countries, this being one of 
the very goals of TRIPs” (Muzaka 2011, 35). Despite this, Business Monitor 
International expects generic drugs to continue to account for the bulk of the 
                                                      
73 In Bangladesh, product patents were eliminated as a part of the National Drug Policy  
(Chowdhury, Bangladesh: A Tough Battle for a National Drug Policy 1995, 104) 
74 “Compulsory licensing is when a government allows someone else to produce the patented 
product or process without the consent of the patent owner” (WTO 2006). When a 
compulsory license has been issued, the patent owner still has to be paid adequate 
remuneration (WTO 2006). Compulsory licensing also allows “export of much needed 
patented medicines into countries that have no pharmaceutical manufacturing sector of their 
own” (Kaplan & Liang, 2005: 2) 
pharmaceutical market in Bangladesh. This also has to do with the fact that the 
patents of some originator drugs have already expired, while others, examples being 
some beta blockers and anti-diabetics, will continuously expire (Business Monitor 
International 2014, 24), meaning that they can be produced generically. The prices of 
the drugs that are still under patent protection by 2016, are expected to increase 
though75, and moreover, the export market of Bangladesh’s pharmaceutical producers 
for these drugs “will be confined to eligible importing countries only” (Yusuf og 
Alam 2008, 139). Furthermore, it is expected that the smaller pharmaceutical 
companies, who are unable to conform to the current GMP standards and depend 
mostly on generic drugs, will be put in a greatly disadvantageous position by the 
patent regime (Yusuf og Alam 2008, 140). 
On a contrary note, Business Monitor International actually considers the 
implementation of patent protection in 201676 to be an opportunity for the 
pharmaceutical sector (Business Monitor International 2014, 9), as it “will bring 
greater long-term benefits, such as improved diplomatic relations with developed 
states and much-needed foreign investment”, while it will probably affect patients and 
pharmaceutical manufacturers negatively in the short run (Business Monitor 
International 2014, 69).  
7.0 Discussion 
With our analysis of the pharmaceutical industry in Bangladesh and review of the 
political settlement in Bangladesh, we have sought to explain how the pharmaceutical 
industry emerged in Bangladesh, whilst we also have highlighted aspects about the 
impending compliance to the TRIPS agreement in 2016.  
7.1 Institutions, the political settlement and agency 
In this paper we have sought to include a broad institutional outlook, not examining 
economic institutions alone in seeking to determine economic development. With our 
                                                      
75 As mentioned in a previous footnote, patent owners have to be paid adequate remuneration, 
even when a compulsory license is used, meaning that the cost of producing these drugs will 
increase 
76 Recently, ”Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina urged the World Intellectual Property 
Organization(WIPO) to allow Bangladesh to continue to produce patented pharmaceuticals 
without permission from innovators for a minimum of 15 years beyond the end of its current 
exemption in 2016”, but BMI considers this extension to be unlikely (Business Monitor 
International 2014, 68-69)   
research agenda and analysis we have sought to illuminate how the political 
institutions shape the economic institutions, and hence also economic development. 
The analysis showcased, that if we want to understand how the NDP emerged in 
1982, a political settlement assessment provides valuable insight. For example, it 
seems apparent that the de-nationalization of industries of the 1970’s was politically 
and ideologically motived, which in turn created the proper economic environment, in 
which the pharmaceutical industry could emerge. It seems unlikely that a 
pharmaceutical industry was to emerge during the 1970’s where rent-capturing was 
aggressively being pursued, in part as consequence of the nationalization of 
industries. The de-nationalization process came about because of political influence. 
In this respect it also seems apparent that inspecting human agency and agential roles 
also has a part to play in our specific case. President Rahman’s liberal influence very 
much shaped the political scene during this period, and his capabilities to take action 
were to high degree dependent on the authoritative institutional structure of the 
Bangladeshi society77. 
7.2 Incremental change of the political settlement & economic 
development 
One of the aims with a political settlements analysis is to explore struggles over 
holding power, wherefore the political settlements analysis provide a framework to 
understanding economic development in times of political (in) stability. Ershad’s 
pursuit of the NDP happened right after a transition period between two regimes, and 
political instability was characteristic of this period, so how was it possible to meet 
the demands from this vulnerable sector? In our assessment, the growth-stability 
trade-off was not at stake, because the authoritative structure78 secured an operational 
equilibrium between the bureaucratic and political sub-systems. Furthermore, 
Rahman and Ershad’s tactics of pitting the political organizations against each other 
(by checking their holding power), gave latitude for Ershad to pursue his own 
political agendas.  
The institutional structure of Bangladesh has remained extractive in its nature because 
the competitive clientelistic traits have carried over through the different phases of the 
political settlement. Acemoglu and Robison’s path dependency framework seems to 
                                                      
77These liberal influences carried over to the Ershad regime, the period in which the NDP was 
pursued.  
78 The top-job was not to be contested. 
be at play in this regard, feedback loops are serving into the same institutional 
structure, but this does not necessarily imply that economic development cannot take 
place. Acemoglu and Robinson’s critical juncture agenda seems insufficiently 
explanatory in our Bangladeshi case, and the transition toward more inclusive 
institutions has not come about because of contingent events79. Rather, the 
development that has occurred within the pharmaceutical industry in Bangladesh is 
better explained through the incremental changes in the political settlement that have 
been taking place. The authoritative institutional structure between the Rahman and 
Ershad regimes remained, and the operational equilibrium of the bureaucratic sub-
system stayed intact during this transition. In large part the NDP of 1982 was able to 
be pursued because the institutional traits remained. Under the democratic 
competitive clientelistic structure (1990 -) capabilities to establish new sectors has 
seriously been weakened. 
We thus question the assumption that Weberian ideals of institutions are a pre-
requisite to economic development, in the case of the pharmaceutical industry in 
Bangladesh, development has taken place under extractive institutions, and inclusive 
institutions are in large part not present yet in Bangladesh. The competitive 
clientelism inherent to the political settlement in Bangladesh hinders a progressive 
move toward inclusive institutions. Nonetheless, economic development has taken 
place under this political settlement configuration, as we have shown with our case of 
the pharmaceutical industry. 
The critical juncture framework somewhat resembles the good governance agenda’s 
idea of moving from a limited access order society to an open access order one. There 
lies an implicit notion of a necessary transformation of the institutions, before 
economic development can take place. Acemoglu and Robinson note that critical 
junctures can spark the move from extractive institutions to inclusive ones. We adhere 
in this paper to Khan’s notion that economic development in turn will spur these 
inclusive institutions, rather than economic development being the result of inclusive 
institutions. The pharmaceutical industry in Bangladesh has developed under 
extractive institutions, though it still faces the challenge of global competitiveness, 
which TRIPS might force upon the industry.  
                                                      
79 Specified in further detail below.  
7.3 Assessing TRIPS, the Current Political Settlement, and the 
Pharmaceutical Industry 
While the NDP played an important role in establishing the pharmaceutical industry 
in Bangladesh, the important aspect about TRIPS is whether it will further the global 
competitiveness of this sector. If TRIPS will have a heavy impact on the Bangladeshi 
production of generic drugs, because product patents are to be abided by, then the 
pharmaceutical industry must seek to adapt to these new circumstances. The expected 
rise in prices of generic drugs might have serious implications for the Bangladeshi 
society, because these drugs have up until now been cheap enough for those on 
middle incomes to buy them, circumstances which might change with increasing 
prices. Business Monitor International does, however, argue that Bangladesh’s 
growing economy and the associated demand for higher quality healthcare should be 
drivers of an increase in the sale of generics (Business Monitor International 2014, 
24). Recent developments in the economy show however a slump in the expected 
GDP of 2014 (possibly partially due to the Rhana Plaza incident), thus raising 
question to Business Monitor’s assessment of the growing economy driving the sales 
of generic drugs despite the rising prices.  
The pharmaceutical industry has up until now been doing well in catching up80 and 
learning-by-doing, but the industry has been protected to a certain degree, in that they 
have been able to produce pharmaceuticals of a lower quality and the domestic supply 
has not had to live up to a certain global standard. The pharmaceutical industry in 
Bangladesh now faces the challenge (TRIPS) of having to produce pharmaceuticals of 
a higher quality, whilst having to catch up with the products provided by MNC’s from 
the West.  
“If a firm has to engage in learning-by-doing to achieve competitiveness, the 
implication is that it has to begin production before it achieves competitiveness. This 
is very significant. Investment in a firm using new technologies in a developing 
country therefore requires some implicit or explicit form of loss-financing as the 
                                                      
80 “The catching up problem can therefore be defined as a) entering globally competitive 
production for a variety of products at the highest feasible levels of quality, b) spreading 
these organizational capabilities broadly to create jobs across the working population and c) 
systematically moving up the quality ladder across product categories to achieve wage 
growth and sustained productivity growth.” (Khan 2013, 76) 
 
organization cannot by definition achieve competitiveness for some considerable 
time.” (Khan 2013, 80) 
This aspect of loss-financing poses a relevant question in relation to our case; will 
investors engage in the necessary process of learning-by-doing to catch up with global 
competitors? Khan highlights in this regard that producing higher quality goods is 
desirable from an economic perspective, (i) since it will benefit in building 
organizational capabilities of industries (Khan 2013, 82), (ii) higher quality goods add 
more value to a product (Khan 2013, 82), (iii) it can have a spill-over effect on other 
goods within the industry (Khan 2013, 83). 
Producing pharmaceuticals of the highest quality might be the most desirable option 
from an economic perspective, though it very much relies on whether the political and 
capitalist elite will finance the required loss-financing to catch up. In this regard the 
Bangladeshi pharmaceutical industry faces two options to catch up, either it can invest 
heavily in research and development to gain new production methods or it can rely on 
the transfer of technologies from MNC’s. In regard to the latter Khan has devised a 
chart to summarize how MNC’s typically engage in technological transfers with 
LDC’s and the issues that may follow. 
7.3.1 Attracting foreign investment and a transfer of technologies 
 
 
 
Source: (Khan 2013, 86) 
At first glance it seems unlikely that the MNC’s are willing to transfer their 
technologies and capabilities to the Bangladeshi firms, as Bangladeshi firms 
potentially soon could be competitors in the market. Interrelated, it is difficult to 
assess whether the ruling coalition will be able to enforce policies that will encourage 
these MNC’s to transfer technologies. Given the current political situation, where The 
BNP and The Awami League are constantly pitted against each other, it is uncertain 
whether a long-term developmental outlook can gain foothold. In this regard the 
determinant factor will be whether the ruling coalition can pursue their political goals 
amidst the current political (in) stability.  
There are some possible courses of action for Bangladesh and the industry to pursue 
though. For example, the government has already approved the establishment of an 
industrial park worth US$ 30 bn focusing on the production of active pharmaceutical 
ingredients (APIs), “with the potential to transform the industry into a major export 
earner” (Business Monitor International 2014, 74), and at the same time, “The project 
is expected to reduce API imports by 90%, which will reduce foreign currency 
expenditure” (Business Monitor International 2014, 75). Thus, it could be argued that 
the government is addressing a collective action problem81 of the pharmaceutical 
industry, since the reliance on importing API’s entails a higher cost than it would to 
produce them in Bangladesh in the long run82. Another hope of the government with 
investing in this industrial park, is that it can provide a stimulus to contract 
manufacturing capabilities in Bangladesh, which could also give a boost to the 
industry domestically (Business Monitor International 2014, 75).  
In regards to contract manufacturing, while TRIPS limits Bangladesh’s opportunities 
in the generic production of on-patent drugs, the possibility that the production of 
some patented drugs is contracted to Bangladeshi companies remains, and according 
to Business Monitor International, “The attraction of recruiting a Bangladesh-based 
contract manufacturer is clear. Costs are among the lowest in the world, and control 
standards are improving rapidly” (Business Monitor International 2014, 74). Thus, 
TRIPS does not eradicate the possibilities of producing on-patent drugs for the 
domestic market, and for exports, as it can be contracted to companies in the country. 
                                                      
81 In our course book States versus Markets, Herman Schwartz repeatedly touches on 
collective action problems, which are problems, or deficiencies, in a country that are common 
for the different individual firms in it. For example, if a country has deficiencies in its basic 
transportation infrastructure, in the existence of a trained labor force, in creating and 
concentrating capital for investment, and in inducing productivity growth and innovation, 
these deficiencies constitute collective action problems for each of the individual firms 
(Schwartz, 2010: 83,87) 
82 The exporters of APIs to Bangladesh obviously have to make a profit, meaning that the 
price of their APIs are higher than the cost of producing them. 
Even though contract manufacturing is an opportunity for the pharmaceutical industry 
in Bangladesh to attract foreign firms, it is unclear whether MNC’s will be 
transferring their technological capabilities in this regard or whether they will take 
advantage of, for example, low labor costs in Bangladesh.  
7.3.2 Investment in research and development 
An investment in research and development similarly seems as a difficult task for the 
pharmaceutical sector to overcome, also due to the current political situation. The 
‘fighting’ between The Awami League and The BNP, might not induce an 
environment where investors are willing to take the risk of investing in new unsecure 
developments. The business environment has further declined as a result of the Rhana 
Plaza incident. It is thus unsure whether the political and capitalist elite (or foreign 
investors) are willing to risk the growth-stability trade-off, in times where economic 
investments might fall through, due to uncertain developments in the political sphere.  
In relation to the abovementioned prospects of promoting the pharmaceutical industry 
as an export earner, one has to take into consideration whether it is actually able to be 
competitive on the international market. For example, India’s pharmaceutical 
industry, “which is arguably 20 years ahead of Bangladesh in terms of development”, 
can stifle the growth potential in Bangladesh (Business Monitor International 2014, 
10). As mentioned in the analysis, the levels of R&D in Bangladesh’s pharmaceutical 
companies are very low compared to the levels in companies from developed 
countries, and it is difficult to see how the Bangladeshi companies should be able to 
catch up in competitiveness, when they are dedicating much less resources to 
innovation. However, also in this regard, it is hoped that the possibility of contract 
manufacturing can provide a remedy as some argue: “that contract manufacturing can 
help transfer costly and most-modern technology to Bangladesh. It also has the 
capacity to reduce production costs, introduce good manufacturing practices and 
make local pharmaceutical firms more efficient” (Business Monitor International 
2014, 76)    
This is very relevant in relation to Chang’s argument that the most detrimental impact 
of the patent system and intellectual property rights protection “lies in its potential to 
block knowledge flows into technologically backward countries that need better 
technologies to develop their economies. Economic development is all about 
absorbing advanced foreign technologies” (Chang 2007, 127). As we see with the 
example of contract manufacturing, however, knowledge flows into developing 
countries are still possible despite TRIPS, but while Bangladesh is able to take 
advantage of protected knowledge until 2016, the knowledge flows related to contract 
manufacturing depends on whether foreign companies actually do contract 
manufacturing with Bangladeshi companies. However, as Khan argues, poor 
protection of technology rents can discourage advanced technology investors (see box 
above), and one could speculate that contract manufacturing of on-patent drugs in 
Bangladesh might be more likely from 2016, when the Bangladeshi firms can no 
longer take advantage of contract manufacturing to subsequently produce the on-
patent drugs generically.  
Having examined both the positive and negative possible impacts of TRIPS on the 
pharmaceutical industry in Bangladesh, we consider there to be some predominance 
of negative impacts. The improved diplomatic relations and increased foreign direct 
investment, which Business Monitor International considered to be the positive 
implications of TRIPS, seem as vague and intangible positive elements. The increased 
cost of producing generic drugs, on the other hand, appears to be a given condition of 
TRIPS. It is evident that TRIPS poses no easy solutions for the Bangladeshi 
pharmaceutical industry, though it might be the necessary force for this sector to truly 
progress. There is only one way this sector can evolve, and that is the hard way, 
learning-by-doing takes time and building an innovative industry is no easy task. It 
will be interesting to observe whether the political landscape will hinder or assist this 
sector in further evolving, but the current political situation does not bode well. In this 
context, if the industry as a whole is heavily influenced by political connections and 
elite rent-capturing, it will be difficult for the pharmaceutical firms to disengage 
themselves from the political environment. This might pose a serious challenge for 
the pharmaceutical firms if they independently wish to pursue growth and 
development, when external agendas are influencing their economic goals.  
 8.0 Conclusion 
Previous to 1982 there had been a desperate need for cheap pharmaceuticals to 
combat the weak conditions in the health sector of the Bangladeshi society. The 
National Drug Policy of 1982 gave advantageous conditions for domestic producers 
of pharmaceuticals, which facilitated establishing this industry in Bangladesh. The 
NDP’s emergence should be interpreted in the light of a shift towards liberal political 
currents influencing in Bangladesh during this period, whilst the de-nationalization of 
the state-owned industries provided latitude for constructing a viable economic 
environment in which the pharmaceutical industry could establish itself. Furthermore, 
the institutionally authoritative structure during this era combined with competitive 
clientelistic traits of the political settlement, provided a configuration in which Ershad 
was able to pursue the NDP without political interference by external political 
organizations. This aspect is partially also to be interpreted in Rahman and Ershad’s 
tactics of decentralization, where they sought to check the holding power of political 
organizers.  
The political settlement in Bangladesh has in its essence remained competitive 
clientelistic in its traits, though there have been various configuration of the 
institutional structure through the last 40 years. Political turmoil has since the 1990’s 
been characterizing the current political settlement of democratic competitive 
clientelism. The antagonistic rivalry between The BNP and The Awami League has 
been describing the political arena in Bangladesh for nearly 25 years. In times when 
these parties have been in the opposition they have made use of economically 
damaging tactics to show their political discontent, Hartals are a vivid example of this 
exercise. Ruling coalitions are thus necessitated to use much energy and time on 
securing political stability in the competitive clientelistic political sub-system. The 
political unrest has further enticed that these ruling coalitions opt for the short 
developmental outlooks and pursue short-term rent-capturing, which mainly is due to 
unknown political developments of the near future. 
The impending TRIPS agreement in 2016 will pose some serious challenges for the 
pharmaceutical industry in Bangladesh. The industry must abide by on-patent drug 
regulations, which in turn will limit the capabilities of Bangladeshi pharmaceutical 
firms in producing cheap generic drugs. Generic pharmaceuticals make up the bulk of 
Bangladeshi medicinal production and the poor population is to a large extent reliant 
on these cheap prices. It is evident that the Bangladeshi pharmaceutical industry must 
evolve and innovate, but it is uncertain whether the industry has such capabilities. 
Furthermore, it is indefinite whether the government can provide the necessary 
assistance to overcoming the inevitable loss-financing process. The current political 
situation, as highlighted above, is a necessary evaluation in this regard. Political 
unrest might hinder the ruling coalition’s capabilities in assisting the pharmaceutical 
industry, while short developmental outlooks might not provide the necessary 
financing for the pharmaceutical industry to evolve.  
For the industry to reach global competitiveness it seems that there are two options 
that could be pursued, either the industry can rely on investing more heavily in 
research and development or seek to gain a transfer of technologies from MNC’s. It is 
in this regard doubtful whether the ruling coalition can assist in research and 
development, while it seems similarly unlikely that an environment can be established 
where MNC’s are willing to transfer their technological capabilities to Bangladeshi 
pharmaceutical firms. Nonetheless, contract manufacturing stands as an option that 
could provide the necessary assistance for Bangladeshi firms. It appears to be 
manifest though that TRIPS is an aspect which the pharmaceutical industry must take 
into consideration in an impending perspective, though it could serve as the necessary 
force to drive further development for the industry. 
On a theoretical note we have sought to illuminate that an institutional perspective 
provides much latitude to understanding economic development. The political 
settlements perspective further illustrates, in relation to our case, that the political 
institutions of society shape the economic development of a country. In our case it 
appears that economic development can take place under extractive institutions, 
which raises question to the notion that economic development comes as a result of 
the ‘right’ institutional set-up.  
We had originally sought to include in this paper a theoretical framework that 
incorporated the works of Adrian Leftwich and Sarah Philips, who make use of a 
human agency perspective in combination with their political settlements analyses. 
Considerations on agential capacity would have in this regard provided valuable 
insight to, for example, how Ershad was able to pursue the NDP of 1982, whilst he 
had to deal with the many political organizations that sought to gain holding power 
(and rents) at the time.  
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Appendix 
Appendix 1 
We have maintained the basic format of Khan’s chart, but altered its contents to more 
directly relate it to the research agenda of this paper. In the outcomes section of this 
chart we have sought to inform on which effects the political settlement has had upon 
the pharmaceutical industry and health sector, rather than broader societal outcomes.   
Dominant 
Institutional 
Characteristics 
Political Sub-
System 
Bureaucratic Sub-
System 
Economic Sub-
System 
Outcomes in the 
Health 
Sector/Pharma Ind. 
1971 – 1975 
 
Dominant Party 
Rule 
 
Socialist Planning 
 
Competition 
between the 
political 
organizations to 
capture rents. 
 
Competitive 
Clientelism 
 
Brief attempt at 
instating a one-
party state.  
 
Socialism 
influencing the 
political agenda 
Weak bureaucratic 
capabilities. 
 
The bureaucratic 
and administrative 
capabilities had 
been placed in 
West-Pakistan.  
A process of 
nationalization of 
industries took off, 
partially because of 
socialist planning, 
but also for the 
political 
organizations to 
create new sources 
for rent-capturing.  
 
An environment for 
private economic 
organizations to 
emerge was thus 
not established. 
The influence of 
socialist ideologies 
entailed that drugs 
were to be free of 
charge for the 
whole population. 
Weak 
administrative 
capabilities and few 
resources meant 
that this was 
virtually 
impossible.  
 
The nationalization 
process undermined 
private enterprises, 
thus a 
pharmaceutical 
industry had tough 
conditions to 
establish itself.  
1975- 1990  
 
Authoritarian 
Clientelism 
 
Liberal 
Economics 
An authoritative 
institutional 
structure headed 
by former 
General Rahman 
and later General 
Ershad. Formally 
multiparty 
system. 
A stronger 
bureaucratic sub-
system is built. The 
administrative 
capabilities have 
improved under the 
authoritative 
hierarchical 
institutional 
The abandonment 
of socialist 
planning and the 
de-nationalization 
process induce a 
better economic 
environment. 
Liberal economics 
influencing the 
The pharmaceutical 
industry in 
Bangladesh 
emerges during this 
period. The 
National Drug 
Policy of 1982 
plays andimportant 
role, though the 
liberal economic 
 Source: (Khan 2013, 24) 
 
 
 
Mix of inclusion 
and exclusion of 
political 
organizations.  
 
Competitive 
clientelism still 
inherent.  
structure.  political agenda. 
 
The garment 
industry establishes 
itself during this 
phase.  
influence and the 
de-nationalization 
of industries 
process play a 
similar important 
role for this sector’s 
emergence.  
1990 – 
 
Competitive 
Clintelist 
Democracy 
Two parties 
dominate politics 
The Awami 
League and BNP, 
each have sought 
to further 
consolidate their 
power, but 
without luck. 
 
A democratic 
multiparty set-up, 
but still 
competitive 
clientelistic in 
nature.  
Weakened 
administrative and 
bureaucratic 
capabilities, due to 
fragmented politics 
between the 
dominant parties.  
Adverse 
opportunities for 
firms and sectors 
far from the 
competitive 
frontier, moderate 
environment for 
already established 
sectors. 
We rather wish to 
discuss the possible 
outcomes this 
phase will have on 
future events. Thus 
in our chapter of 
discussion we will 
evaluate on the 
political settlement 
characteristics and 
impending event 
(TRIPS) that will 
affect the 
pharmaceutical 
industry in 
Bangladesh.  
